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INTRODUCTION 
Opinions do not generate in a vacuum; they are the 
product of thoughts which have sifted down from many 
sources. One important contributor to this influx of 
ideas has been the historian. But even while the importance 
of his role is acknowledged, his effects are not always 
readily calculable, and it is sometimes difficult to dis­
cern whether a better understanding of past events has had 
any significance in shaping men's responses to contempo­
rary issues. It is the thesis of this paper that there 
have been certain situations when historical research had 
an important bearing on the choices statesmen made and 
the policies they pursued. This will be illustrated by 
focusing on a group of historiane known as revisionists 
and analyzing the impact of their work on one particular 
event, Britain's reaction to the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland. 
Called revisionists because they reached conclusions 
at variance with previously accepted versions of the First 
World War, these men helped to alter the entire scheme of 
values and beliefs concerning Anglo-German relations 
during the inter-war period. Their new explanations for 
the causes of the war pervaded the intellectual climate 
1
 
2 
of the twenties and thirties and became an integral part 
of the body of ideas that nurtured the British philosophy 
of appeasement. Furthermore, the evidence they uncovered 
did much to predispose officials and public opinion in 
favor of pro-German alterations to the Treaty of Versailles. 
CHAPTER I 
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
When the First World War divided Europe into two 
antagonistic camps, it aroused passions which made attempts 
to analyze the origins of such a dreadful catastrophe almost 
impossible. One has only to glance at some of the eighty­
seven issues of the OXford Pamphlets, published in 1914 and 
1915, to learn the accepted British position on all aspects 
of the war. Another source for revealing each country's 
official version of its entry into the war was found in 
what were termed "color books" pUblished at the outset of 
the fighting, containing carefully selected docu~ents from­
the foreign offices. Not too surprisingly, the British 
Blue Book and the French Yellow Book arrived at similar 
conclusions: the Germans were guIlty. Even historical 
writing to emerge during the war and immediately after 
sustained this standard interpretation, and one of the most 
influential was produced by J. W. Headlam (later Headlam­
Morley), historical advisor to the British Foreign Office. 1 
In his book, Headlam recounted the immediate events 
1James Wycliff Headlam The History of Twelve Days: 
July 24~ to August 4~, 1914, (London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 
1915). 
3 
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leading to hostilities and no significant challenges to 
this version appeared until the opening of the foreign 
office archives. 
After the return to peace, memoirs of political and 
military leaders involved in the war or the years leading 
up to it began to emerge, lending added credence to many 
of Headlam's positions. The publication of works by well­
known figures, such as Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and 
former Foreign Minister and the President of the French 
Republic Raymond Poincare~ continued to maintain Germany's 
guilt, while discounting the importance of most of the new 
documentary evidence to appear since 1918. 2 
But in spite of the array of information criticizing 
Germany, the fighting was hardly over, indeed, the Treaty 
itself barely concluded, when many of these interpretations 
began to undergo severe scrutiny and eventual attack by some 
of the most respected historians in England and abroad. 
There were a number of reasons for this rapid change, and 
the historical writing that occurred as a result was 
referred to as revisionist. 
One of the stimulations to further research was the 
vast propaganda effort of the Germans, carried out with 
2Herbert Henry Asquith, The Genesis of the War, (New 
York: George H. Doran Co., 1923), ~p. 246-279; Raymond
Poincare, The Origins of the War, {London: Cassell and Co. 
Ltd., 1922). 
5 
efficiency and effectiveness in the years immediately after 
the Peace Conference. Largely in response to Article 231 of 
the Versailles Treaty, or what came to be known as the "war 
guilt clause," the German Foreign Office set up a special 
section--the Kriegsschuldreferat--to do research on the 
origins of the war in order to dispute this charge. Alfred 
von Wegerer, an ex-army officer, was given money to launch 
the periodical Kriegsschuldfrage (War-Guilt Question), and 
it soon became an influential journal, publishing many of 
the early revisionists along with any information or docu­
3ments favorable to the German case. 
What exactly was this German propaganda effort directed 
against? The six volume study of the History of the Peace 
Conference, edited by Harold Temperley, presents a detailed 
account of the armistice and Treaty of Versailles, empha­
sizing those portions which gave rise to so much distress 
and bitterness in Germany.4 There was no issue that engen­
dered more controversy, however, than that of reparations, 
and it soon came to overshadow all other considerations. 
3Martin Gilbert, ~he Roots of Appeasement, (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 23. 
4Harold William Temperley, ed., A History of the 
Peace Conference: ~e Settlement With Germa ,Vol. II of 
History of the Peace Conference vols., ondon: Henry 
Froude, Hodder and stoughton, 1920), pp. 41-43. Also see 
Carl Bergmann, The History of Reparations, ~ondon: Ernest 
Benn Ltd., 1927). 
\ 6 
In order to insure that once the Peace Cbnference had 
ended, legal means would exist for enforcing German payment 
for the cost of the war as well as for the damages to ci­
vilian,~ life and property, the Allies carefully worded Articles 
231 and 232 in the reparations section of the Treaty to 
cover both a moral and a legal obligation. 5 As Temperley 
analyzed them, the first of these two clauses (Article 231) 
" ••• asserts the responsibility of Germany and her Allies 
for causing all the loss and damage suffered by her enemies 
as a result of the War. This responsibility is a moral and 
not a financial responsibility."6 On the other hand, it 
was Article 232 which stipUlated It ••• the extent to which 
any debtor can be made financially respmnsible is limited 
by his ability to pay •••• ,,7 
It should be noted that at no time did the Entente 
Powers intend for Articles 231 and 232 to be a statement 
5Article 231 as quoted in Temperley, A History of 
the Peace Conference, II., p. 45 reads: 
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and 
Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and 
her allies for causing all the loss and damage to 
which the Allied and Associated Governments and 
their nationals have been subjected as a conse­
quence of the war imposed upon them by the 
aggression of Germany and her allies. 
6Ibid ., p. 75. 
7Ibid • 
7 
of "war guilt. T1 Only later, when the Germans attempted to 
build a propaganda case to discredit the Versailles Treaty, 
did the articles take on such a connotation. As the 
historian Rajo Holborn has shown in his discussion of 
these two articles, when they were written there was not 
the slightest reason to assume that the word "aggression" 
meant anything more than legal liability. To the contrary: 
We have good evidence that the Big Four, when 
putting Articles 231-2 into final shape, did not 
mention war guilt at all. Rather, they were 
almost exclusively concerned with the practical 
application of the Lansing note ••••Only the 
German's feverish conviction that the treaty 
was bound to contain a statement on Germanyt s 8 
sole war guilt made them seize upon Article 231. 
Germany's sense of injustice, whether valid or 
fabricated regarding this clause, was further inflamed by 
the Allies' refusal to negotiate any of the Treaty's 
provisions. Instead, their delegation to the Conference 
was given an opportunity to make observations on the docu­
ment and then present them to the Allied and Associated 
Powers. In return, they received the Allies' reply which 
not only verified the severity of the Treaty's terms, 
but reaffirmed Germany's belief that Article 231 was a 
declaration of guilt with the statement that: 
8Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germa 1840-1945,
Vol. III of A History of Modern Germa~y'~ ~ ew York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 564-565. 
8 
Germany being responsible for the war and for the 
'savage and inhuman manner in which it was conducted' 
bad committed 'the greatest crime against humanity 
and tbe freedom of peoples that any nation, calling 
itself civilized has ever consciously committed. '9 
Although active resistance to the Treaty was impracti­
cal after the defeated nation had been disarmed, two other 
alternatives could be pursued: one would be to adhere to 
passive resistance whenever possible; the other would be 
to refute what bad popularly come to be termed the moral 
basis of the Treaty. By proving that their country had 
not been solely responsible for initiating the war, 
Germany could undermine a critical reason for imposing 
many of its most detested provisions. In the attainment 
of this second aim, the Reich engaged in a tremendous 
propaganda effort which had a significant impact on the 
bistorical writing of the post-war era. Immediately after 
the war, in an effort to clear their nation of the impu­
tation of guilt, they opened up files, records, foreign 
office documents, and memoranda to historians. According 
to an article by Cbarles Beard analyzing current histori­
ography about the war, the availability of tbese sources 
altered the traditional rule tbat normally tbe generation 
wbo fought a war knew little about it because diplomatic 
9Temperley, The History of the Peace Conference, II., 
p. 11. 
9 
archives usually are not opened for fifty to one hundred 
10years. General access to German, Austrian, and also 
Russian documents, made available after the Communist 
Revolution in order to discredit the Czarist regime, offered 
historians unprecendented opportunity for critical study 
of the years leading up to the war. The German propaganda 
effort also stimulated historians into reexamining the 
entire German "case," for its veracity. While in the 
process of this research, some men uncovered evidence which 
impelled them either to modify or contradict earlier 
assumptions about the responsibility for the war, and they 
became known as revisionists. 
But this term, when applied to an entire group, can 
be misleading; consequently, as used in this thesis, 
revisionist will include any historian who varied from the 
accepted or official position as espoused so lucidly in 
Headlam's book The Twelve Days, or in the government 
documents collected in the "color books." Within this 
broad spectrum, there are various differences, ranging 
from those who offered only minor discrepancies, to those 
who challenged all prior assumptions. It is important to 
note, however, that no matter how slight the difference, 
any admission of liability by the Entente or lessening of 
10Charles Beard, "Heroes and Villains of the World 
War," Current History, XXIV (August, 1926), pp. 730-735. 
gUilt on the part of Germany was a victory for the German 
propaganda effort because it threw doubt upon the validity 
of the Treaty and undermined its moral base. 
Three historians who suggested only moderate revision, 
George Peabody Gooch, Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, and Pierre 
Renouvin, tended to agree that although the Central Powers 
were blameworthy, they were not alone in creating war; 
moreover, Austria was as much at fault as Germany or perhaps 
even more so. Gooch, author of numerous books on European 
and British history, as well as co-editor with Harold 
Temperley, of the British Documents on the Origins of the 
War. 1898-1914, occupied an influential position among 
British historians. In 1923, Gooch and A. W. Ward edited 
Volume III of The Cambridge History of Foreign Policy, 1866­
1919, at which time they began to admit some division of 
accountability between Austria and Germany.11 Four years 
later Gooch published an important work, Recent Revelations 
of European Diplomacy, reviewing a large body of material 
relating to the origins of the war. He interspersed 
throughout this book the thesis that no one nation was 
inherently evil; rather all acted as might be expected 
under the circumstances. And after studying each country 
11A. W. Ward and George Peabody Gooch, eds., The 
Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1866-19~ 
Vol. III of The Cambrid e Histor of British Forei n Polic , 
1783-1919, (3 vols., New York: MacMillan Co., 1923 • 
11 
objectively, he showed that no ~ participant was gUilty 
of wanting or producing war. If anything, all had been 
12
shortsighted in folluwing such inept policies. 
An American historian, Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, 
was also engaged in studying the reasons for the war. 
Although his two volume work, The Coming of the War, 1914, 
did not appear until 1930, he was among the earliest 
historians to begin scrutinizing the issue of German 
"war gUilt.,,13 While admitting that Germany's legal 
accountability stemmed from the act of declaring war, 
Schmitt also introduced the questions of political and 
moral liability as considerations. But he disagreed with 
certain revisionists like Harry Elmer Barnes who construed 
the new documents being brought to public attention as 
sufficient evidence for clearing Germany completely of any 
14hand in initiating the war. Throughout the 1920's, 
Schmitt continued to devote his energy to the task of 
presenting his own thesis in various periodicals or 
12George Peabody Gooch, Recent Revelations of European 
Diplomac~, (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1927), 
pp. 206- 07,213. 
13Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, The comi~ of the War, 
1914, (2 vols., New York: Charles Scribners ~ns, 1930). 
14Bernadotte Everly' Schmitt, "A Distinguished American 
Historian Ap~ortions the War Guilt," Current History, XXIII 
(March, 1920), pp. 796-803. 
12 
reviewing works by other historians. 15 And in these arti­
cles, Schmitt restated the idea that once Europe had sepa­
rated into armed camps due to the alliance system, war 
became unavoidable in 1914: 
••• because then, for the first time, the lines 
were sharply drawn between the two rival groups, 
and neither could yield on the Serbian issue 
without seeing the balance pass definitely to 
the other side.16 
In France, as well as England and America, historians 
were also reviewing official interpretations about the war; 
and Pierre Renouvin was one of those who succe.eded admirably 
in his goal of making an objective examination of the en­
tire problem. In his book, Renouvin concentrated mainly 
on the crisis occurring between June 28 and August 4, 1914; 
but even more than had Gooch or Schmitt, he emphasized 
German responsibility.17 Renouvin also stressed the need 
for making an objective analysis, carefully defining, in 
one essay, the role of the historian. It was " •.•not to 
fix responsibilities but rather to furnish explanations 
15:Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, "July, 1914,11 Foreign 
Affairs, V (October, 1926), pp. 132-147; "Where Does the 
Guilt Lie?" The Saturday Review of Literature, III (November 
20, 1926), pp. 311-312; "Diplomatic Europe,~ The Saturday 
Review of Literature, V (March 2, 1929), pp. 721 T726; "The 
Origins of the War," The Journal of Modern History, I 
(March, 1929), pp. 112-119. 
16:Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, "Triple Alliance and 
Triple Entente, 1902-1914," American Historical Review, 
XXIX (April, 1924), pp. 449-473. 
17Pierre Renouvin The Immediate Origins of the War, 
28 ili June-4 ili August 1914~, trans. Theodore Carswell Hume, 
New Haven: Yale Onlversity Press, 1928), pp. 10-11,35-37, 
40-41,333-334,342. 
13 
and to make clear the circumstances which guided the 
development of international policies.,,18 
Moderate revisionists Sidney Bradshaw Fay, Alfred 
Fabre-Luce, and Mary Edith Durham all tried to distribute 
the blame more evenly among the major powers than had 
their conservative counterparts Gooch, Schmitt, and 
Renouvin. Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson and Alcide Ebray 
shifted the emphasis away from blaming anyone nation or 
group of nations; instead, they condemned the system of 
alliances for producing a situation of international 
anarchy--the real culprit. 
Perhaps the most well-known among the moderate 
revisionists, and certainly one of the earliest to start 
questioning the Ilwar guilt" verdict, was Sidney ill:.'adshaw 
Fay. In the July and October 1920 issues of the American 
Historical Review, he began to examine earlier premises 
relating to the German case, refuting many of the most 
widely accepted of them. 19 Fay's ideas received much 
18Pierre Renouvin, "How the War Came," Foreign Affairs, 
VII (April, 1929), p. 384. 
19Sidney Bradshaw Fay, "New Light on the Origins of 
the World War, II American Historical Review, XXV (July, 1920), 
p. 628; "New Light on the Origins of the \var, II, Berl in and 
Vienna, July 29 to 31, 'T The American Historical Review, XXVI 
(October, 1920), pp. 52-53; "New Light on the Origins of the 
War, III, Russia and the Other Powers," The American Historical 
Review, XXVI (January, 1921), pp. 250-251. 
14 
notice and attracted interest throughout the decade as he 
continued pUblishing additional information further sub­
stantiating his earlier views. 20 Then in 1928, Fay's ~o 
volume work on The Origins of the War appeared, uniting all 
of these arguments and others into an extended analysis of 
both the long range and immediate causes. Within each 
volume, Fay explicitly stressed the didactic nature of his 
work and called for a revision of the Versailles verdict 
which he said was historically unsound: 
One must abandon the dictum of the Versailles 
Treaty that Germany and her allies were solely 
responsible. It was a dictum exacted by victors 
from vanquished, under the influence of the 
blindness, ignorance, hatred and propagandist 
misconceptions to which war has given rise.21 
In the first volume, emphasizing the long range issues 
leading to conflict, Fay implicated all of the major powers 
to some degree. He classified these issues under the system 
of secret alliances, militarism, nationalism, economic imperi­
alism, and the press. Each contributed to a poisoning of 
the atmosphere between nations and a heightening of tensions 
20Sidney Bradshaw Fay, "Serbia's Responsibility for 
the World War," Current History, XXIII (October, 1925), pp. 
41-48; "Who Started the War?" The New Republic, XLV (January
6, 1926), pp. 185-186, "Serajevo Pifteen Years After," The 
Living Age, CCCXXXVI \ July, 1929), pp. 374- 379; "Pre-War 
Diplomacy and the Press,1l current History, XXXIII (November,
1930), pp. 212-217. 
21Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War, 
Vol. II of The Origins of the World War, (2 vols., 2nd. ed., 
New York: MacMillan Co., 1928), pp. 548-549. 
15 
which could only conclude in a war. In addition, Fay 
recognized one special situation--conflict in the Balkans-­
as another long range cause, because it was " •••most nearly 
incapable of a peaceful solution. 1122 The second volume of 
the work examined immediate events, and here Fay appeared 
far more critical of individual nations, apportioning to 
Austria the largest share of the blame, and characterizing 
Germany as a victim of her alliance with the Dual Monarchy 
whom she needed as her one dependable ally.23 Fay did 
suggest that Germany had erred first by cutting off ties 
with Russia in 1890 and later by giving Austria a blank 
check on the eve of war. 
Mary Edith Durham, haVing carefully studied the tense 
Balkan situation, agreed with Fay's conclusions regarding 
Serbia's role in the crisis. She first published her 
findings, justifying the Austrian Ultimatum, in 1923. She 
considered the note an appropriate response to the Archduke's 
assassination in the face of Serbian complicity in the 
entire plot, coupled with their refusal to allow Austrian 
officials to participate in the search for the criminals. 24 
22 Ibid., Vol. I., p. 546. 
23Ibid., Vol. II., pp. 553-554. 
24Mary Edith Durham, "Croatia and Greater Serbia," 
Contemporary Review, CXXIX (November, 1923), pp. 595-597; 
"Fresh Light on Serbia and the War," Contemporary Review, 
CXXIV (September, 1928), p. 304. 
16 
Five years later Miss Durham finished The Serajevo Crime, 
detailing the activity of the Greater Sebian movernen~ all 
the way back to 1782. 25 
Another supporter of divided responsibility, the 
Frenchman Alfred Fabre-Luce, made no secret of the motives 
for writing his book. Troubled over France's failure to 
realize the fruits of Victory, he argued that peace could 
only be termed successful for his country if it prevented 
a new war. But this could not happen until the truth 
about the origins of the last war were told. 26 
Rather tban seek to censure anyone power or group 
as other revisionists had tried to do, Goldsworthy Lowes 
Dickinson preferred to view war as a product of tbe inter­
national system of anarchy. Insisting that " ••• the anarchy 
of armed States defeats the good intentions of tbe most 
admirable men,,,27 Dickinson portrayed international re­
lations in the period before 1914 as a circle of inter­
connected facts. 28 Hopefully, he wrote in the preface to 
his book, once people recognized the inherent dangers in 
the balance of power system as it existed prior to the war, 
25Mary Edith Durham, The Serajevo Crime, (London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1925), pp. 12-15. 
26Alfred Fabre-Lues, The Limitations of Victory, trans. 
Constance Vesey, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), pp. 201-204. 
27Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, The International Anarchy, 
1904-1914, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1926), p. 36. 
28±bid., p. 46. 
17 
they would work to alter this structure. Thus, like so 
many of the revisionists, Dickinson intended his work to 
serve as an historical lesson and a guide to world peace. 
Alcide Ebray!s book proposed a thesis similar to 
Dickinson's. There was no "guilty party," first, because 
responsibility was divided, and second, because the war was 
unavoidable since everyone did what it was only natural he 
should do. 29 Ebray was particularly harsh on France, 
condemning her for being It ••• l ess energetic in urging 
Russia to take up ~ conciliatory attitude than Germany was 
in her similar advice to Austria.,,30 Also, like Dickinson, 
Ebray hoped his book would establish the truth in order to 
promote reconciliation between the powers and thereby 
introduce a truly stable Europe. Ebray explicitly attacked 
the Treaty because it did not conform to historical evi­
dence as he perceived it, and he called for its revision 
as the first step in making peace a reality.31 
Almost immediately after the armistice was signed, 
the German government began work on presenting their 
version of the causes for the war. It was the Versailles 
29Alcide Ebray, A Frenchman Looks at the Peace, trans. 
E. W. Dickes, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. xxi. 
30Ibid., p. 19.
 
' . "i"
31 Ib d pp. X1-X1 1.___1_., 
18 
Treaty, however, that gave a focus and direction to this 
effort, as well as attracting historians from other 
countries to delve into the entire problem. A number of 
those who claimed to have discovered evidence exonerating 
Germany from any share in bringing about the war have been 
termed radical revisionists. One reason for this is the 
sUbjectivity which characterized many of their books and 
articles; they made no effort to hide the purpose of their 
work--revision of the Treaty. Beginning with the a priori 
assumption that the Versailles Settlement was unfair to 
Germany, they sought to prove that it was based on faulty 
evidence which could only lead to inaccurate conclusions; 
therefore, the Treaty must be changed before a lasting 
European peace could be secured. They also tended to take 
the most extreme view in reapportioning the blame for the 
war, maintaining German innocence, and portraying her as 
a victim of the Entente's maneuverings to impose war upon 
the unwitting Central Powers. 
Early in the 1920 1 s, numerous articles written by 
Germans such as Hans Delbruck, Karl Kautsky, Count Max 
Montgelas, and Alfred von Wegerer began appearing in 
European and American periodicals. Along with the presen­
tation of new evidence obtained from the recently opened 
foreign office documents, whenever possible these men 
19 
rejected the 'lease" against Germany.32 
Additional support for this rehabilitation program 
carried on by German writers came from the radical revision­
ists led by Harry Elmer Barnes who wrote prodigiously, pro­
moting German innocence and disputing all other views. 33 
Barnes also published two controversial and one-sided 
attacks on the Treaty in which he rated material according 
to the degree that it sustained his own position. 34 He 
and his supporters ultimately became emeshed in academic 
arguments, particularly with Bernadotte Schmitt whom they 
referred to as a "salvager," and frequently they devoted 
as much attention to discrediting other historians as to 
32Hans Delbruck, "Did the Kaiser Want the War?" The 
Contemporary Review, CXIX (March, 1921), p. 322; Karl Kautsky,
"Germany Since the War, I' Foreign Affairs, II (December 15, 
1922), p. 104; Count Max Montgelas, The Case for the Central 
Powers: An 1m eachment of the Versailles Verdict, trans. 
Constance Vesey, London: George Al en & Unwin Ltd., 1925), 
p. 200; "Letters to the Editor," The Nation and the Athenae~-,­
XXXII (October 14, 1922), p. 54; "A French View of War Origins," 
The Nation, CXXI (November 18, 1925), pp. 578-579; Alfred 
von Wegerer, A Refutation of the Versailles War Guilt Thesis, 
trans. Edwin H. Zeyde, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930), pp. 
9-10,42-43,189,320-321. 
33Harry Elmer Barnes, "Salvaging German War GUilt," 
The New Republic, LXIV (October 22, 1930), pp. 270-273. 
34Harry Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World War: 
An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt, (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1926); In Quest of Truth and Justice, 
(N.P.: Published by the National Historical Society, 1928). 
20 
their own research. 35 
In the long run, however, for the prospects of en­
forcing the Treaty, the differences between Barnes and 
other historians proved less significant than their simi­
larities. Regardless of the amount of revision the events 
leading to the war had been subjected to, the fact that 
they were open to any revision at all jeopardized attempts 
at rebuilding a peace based on the Treaty of Versailles. 
Once German propaganda had successfully blurred the legal 
and moral distinctions underpinning the reparations 
sections of the Settlement it was not difficult for people 
to accept the notion that Article 231 implied German guilt. 
And the consequence of this tactic was seriously to impair 
the authority of the Peace Treaty during the inter-war years. 
Before leaving these historians, it must be emphasized 
that in the majority of instances they did not intend to 
produce this outcome when they began their research. 
Nevertheless, the evidence that they uncovered, when it 
contradicted earlier theories, could also be used to weaken 
the foundations upon which the Treaty had unintentionally 
come to rest. 
35Harry Elmer Barnes, IIEngland Arraigns Herself,1I The 
Nation, CXXV (August 17, 1927), p. 162; C. Raymond Reazley, 
liThe Great Reversal,1I The Christian Century, XLIV (June 30, 
1927), pp. 805-806; Michael Hermond Cochran, Germany Not 
Guilty in 1914, (Boston: The Stratford Co., 1931), pp. 3,12­
14,18. 
CHAPTER II 
REVISIONIST HISTORY BECOMES A POLITICAL FORCE 
As historians continued to research the materials 
that had become available since the war, many of them un­
covered additional discrepancies. Their findings soon 
attracted academic notice which rapidly expanded beyond 
these circles to include a widespread audience. This 
chapter will examine the depth to which the revisionists' 
ideas permeated Britain's intellectual class and filtered 
throughout the rest of society by the end of the twenties. 
It will also illustrate how those who sought to weaken the 
Treaty were able to seize upon the historians' conclusions 
for this purpose. 
The Versailles Settlement had hardly been ratified 
before it began to be modified: first by the Allies' 
abandonment of their demands for the surrender of the 
former Emperor and other Germans accused of war crimes, and 
next on their attitudes towards reparations and disarmament. 1 
Written in circumstances unfavorable to impartial deliber­
ation, the completed Treaty was a series of compromises. 
Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, From Versailles to Munich, 
1918-1938, ed. Harry D. Gideones, Public Policy Pamphlet No. 
28, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 3,4. 
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Nevertheless, until other alternatives could be found, it 
represented the legal foundations of international law for 
the signatories. Germany recognized this and knew the 
only means for restoring her position was to discredit 
the detested document. 
In pursuing that goal, the Weimar Republic did not 
find itself alone. Economists, politicians, diplomats, and 
historians from all countries had an interest in changing 
certain provisions of the Treaty. One of the first serious 
challenges to this document, occurring even before the final 
drafts were signed, came from John Maynard Keynes in 
Economic Consequences of the Peace. By giving a literal 
interpretation to the reparations sections, he demonstrated 
that, if carried out, the results would be disastrous. What, 
he pondered, could have been the motives of the politicians 
who framed such unrealistic provisions? Three years later, 
in another book, Keynes explicitly attacked this group~ 
suggesting that all along they had known the Treaty would 
be unworkable but had proceeded anyway in any attempt to 
2
satisfy public opinion calling for vengence. 
But the tangle of reparations did morethan open the 
way for criticism of the politicians and the results they 
2John Maynard Keynes, A Revision of the Treaty, (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922), pp. 9-10,15-16,180. 
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produced at Versailles. Equally important, Keynes' work 
began to generate feelings of guilt and sympathy for the 
German Republic. 3 There were also a number of other 
considerations to reinforce these attitudes. First, 
neither in the economic nor the political sphere had there 
been any deep-seated ~radition of hostility toward Germany. 
To the contrary, from the Middle-Ages until the end of the 
nineteenth century, France had been England's chief rival 
on the continent. Generally, Germany had been the ally. 
Moreover, British business interests were anxious to see 
a return of the defeated nation to prosperous conditions. 
Finally, the mass of Englishmen did not understand French 
fears of a revived Reich. 4 It is not too much to say that 
by the mid-1920's, at least in the British popular press, 
France rather than Germany had become the villain of 
Europe, accused of exploiting the Allied victory for her 
own ends. 5 
Within this climate of doubt about Allied treatment 
of former enemies and mounting sympathy for the anomalous 
3Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, p. 62; "Two Appeals 
for International Decency," The Nation, CXXII (April 28, 
1926), pp. 485-486. 
4William Newton Medlicott, British Fbreign POliC~ 
Since Versailles, (London: Methuen and Co., 1940), pp.-7. 
5Robert Graves and Alan Hodge, The Long Week-End: A 
Social History of Great Britain, 1918-1939, (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Co., 1963), p. 155. 
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German position, revisionist historians began to publish 
their findings. Many of their conclusions appeared regu~ 
larly in the form of articles, book reviews, and letters 
to the editor of various periodicals, and began to a~tract 
attention to their work. 6 Moreover, disillusionment with 
the war and the Peace Treaty had developed an audience 
receptive to new explanations of the events precipitating 
the catastrophe. BUt acceptance of these historians did 
not depend only upon the mood of the times. It took the 
academic communities' close scrutiny of the evidence to 
give their work authority and credence. 
In 1924, the editors of Current History organized 
a symposium and called it "Assessing the Blame for the 
World War." They submitted an article by Harry Elmer 
Barnes to professors of history at well-known universities, 
all of whom they considered qualified experts. The results 
indicated that the majority of those questioned supported 
6Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, "An Appeal to British 
Fair Play," The Nation and the Athenaeum, XXXV (August 30, 
1924), pp. 660-661'; George Peabody Gooch, Letter to the 
Editor on "The Myth of War-GUilt," The Nation and the 
Athenaeum, XXXI (September 16, 1922), p. 193; Max Montgelas, 
ItA French V1ew of War Origins," review of The Immediate ~ 
Origins of the War by Pierre Renouvin, The Natlon, CXXI 
(November 18, 1925), pp. 578-579; Kaul Kautsky, f1Germany 
Since the War," Foreign Affairs, II (December 15, 1922), 
pp. 100-107; Alfred von Wegerer, itA Tragic Scoop: The 
Premature Mobilization Report In Germany," The Living Age, 
CCCXIV (July 15, 1922), pp. 138-141; "The Evidence Challenged," 
Current History, XXCIII (August, 1928), pp. 810-819; 
Also see Chapter I: footnotes ~2,13,14,16,17,18,22,30,31,32,33. 
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at least some revisions even if they did not entirely 
accept all of Barnes' ideas. Charles Seymour, from Yale 
University. agreed completely with two of Barnes' chief 
conclusions: neither Germany nor any other single state 
was solely guilty; the disaster had resulted from the 
existence in Europe of two armed camps, each suspicious 
of the other. But Seymour did not accept Barnes' assignment 
of a relative order of blame to each state. Much like 
Dickinson and other moderates, Seymour said if any in­
dictments were to be made, they should be against the 
system which permitted the military in each state to 
impede pacifistic efforts of the civil leaders. And in 
this instance, not withstanding Barnes, German leaders 
had a large share of responsibility for this system. 7 
In contrast to Seymour's reservations, G. H. 
Blakeslee of Clark University called Barnes' analysis 
brilliant. He suggested that Barnes as well as Fay, 
Beard, Schmitt, and Gooch all were in essential agreement 
over the following ideas: no government or responsible 
statesman worked to bring about a war, and the fundamental 
causes were rival alliances, competition for territory, 
economic concessions and prestige, mounting materialism, 
increased armaments, international suspicions, and fear. 
7Charles A. Beard et. al., "Assessing the Blame," 
Gurrent History, XX (June, 1924), pp. 452-453. 
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Finally, all acknowledged that the immediate breakdown of 
peace was Austria's insistence upon waging war with Serbia 
when it was recognized this step could precipitate a 
general European conflict. 8 
Neither William E. Lingelbach of the University of 
Pennsylvania, Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago, 
nor Carl Beeker of Cornell University could accept all of 
Barnes' thesis; nevertheless, they too extended liability 
to all of the major European powers. But Becker found it 
silly and useless either to designate guilt among nations 
in any precise order, or among the governments. 9 As Lingelbach 
indicated, however,the significance of Barnes' work was 
that from the present date, many conventional views of the 
origins of the war would be subject to revision. 10 
Discussing not only Barnes' position but the degree 
to which revisionist theories about the war were generally 
approved by 1924, Raymond Leslie Buell, of Harvard University 
suggested that the opinions expressed by Barnes as well as 
by Fay, Schmitt, and Gboch are "fully accepted by qualified 
historians.,,11 In fact, of the nine historians queried, 
8Ibid ., Blakeslee, pp. 458-459. 
9Ibid ., Becker, pp. 455-456.
 
1Plbid., Lingelbach, p. 454.
 
11Ibid., Buell, pp. 453-454.
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only A. E. Morse of Princeton University totally disagreed 
with Barnes and saw no revision necessary. He blamed 
Germany entirely, seeing her as a continual threat to 
European peace prior to World War I. 12 
Throughout the twenties and early thirties other 
historians added their support to many of the same proposals 
advocated by the revisionists. For example, after evaluating 
Barnes' thesis, Charles Beard claimed it had forever 
demolished the "Sunday-School theory" that three pure innocent 
countries--England, France, and Russia--were suddenly as­
saul ted by German and Austrian villains. On the other hand, 
he did reject any attempt by Barnes to whitewash the Kaiser 
and his advisors; instead, Beard saw them as men who gave 
Austria a free hand with fUll knowledge that such action 
might ignite a general conflict. Yet, he considered the 
German leaders no more or less to blame than other statesmen 
like Poincare, Grey, or Sazonov. 13 
By the end of the decade, a considerable segment of 
the academic community had accepted some revision. When 
criticism was made, it usually came from the radicals led 
by Barnes who did not feel fellow historians had gone far 
enough in shifting the blame from Germany to the Allies. 
12Ibid ., Morse, p. 455. 
13Beard, llHeroes and Villains of the World War," 
pp. 730-735. 
28 
Moreover, men who had written standard accounts of German 
actions began to alter their opinions. One of the most 
influential, Harold Temperley, gave favorable reviews to 
works by Fay, Schmitt, and Renouvin. 14 And in the same year, 
R. B. Mowat wrote an article blaming both the Gentral Powers 
and the Entente for failing to reach a rapprochement 
throughout the pre-war period. 15 
But perhaps the best sign of just how respectable the 
revisionist positions had become was illustrated by a confer­
ence held at Chatham House in November, 1936, on the topic 
of "History T>:ext BOoks as a Factor in International Relations." 
In an address to the gathering, Alec Waugh examined the 
presentation of the "Great War" in English history books, 
and he found: 
The pendulum has swung a great deal in the last few 
years, and the present tendency--a healthy wish to 
let bygones be bygones--is to regard the War as the 
general culmination of a certain series of conditions; 
and to maintain that to attempt to fix the guilt on 
any one nation is as futile as to blame the particu­
lar stone in an avalanche which happens to break 
one's leg.16 
14Harold Temperley, "The Coming of the War," Foreign 
Affairs IX (January, 1931), p. 317; "The Archbishop and the Treaty.~ New Statesman and Nation, III (April 2, 1932), p. 417. 
15R• B. Mowart, "Great Britain and Germany in the Early 
Twentieth Century," The English Historical Review, XLVI 
( July, 1931), p. 441. 
16Alec Waugh, ~History Text Books as a Factor in 
International Relations," International Affairs, XV (November, 
1936), pp. 888-889. 
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With the revisionists' evidence now incorporated into the 
history text, little doubt remains that academic acceptance 
of these views had been achieved. 
But these interpretations could only gain a widespread 
audience and support from the intellectual community if they 
were brought to public attention and discussed. The 
journals and periodicals which frequently published articles 
analyzing the causes of the war provided the medium for 
extending these ideas beyond the historians' sphere. 
As early as 1920, an editorial in The Nation openly 
called the Treaty vindictive and unenforceable. 17 A year 
later, another article suggested: 
If Germany did not-a1one dig the pit into which 
she and the rest of the world fell, then the 
Treaty of Versailles is a lie, its scheme of 
annexations and the confiscations breaks down •••• 18 
The following year, in The Living Age, a forceful editorial 
labeled the whole concept of German guilt a myth. It claimed 
that the main burden for the war fell on Austrian and Russian 
official cliques, although Germany was not entirely innocent. 19 
17Editorial, liThe Blunder and the War Out," The Nation, 
XVI (February 14, 1920), pp. 641-662. 
18H• W. M., "The Question of Responsibility," The 
Nation and the Athenaeum, XXX (October 29, 1921), p. 173. 
19"War Guilt Myths," The Living Age, CCCXV (October
 
28, 1922), pp. 221-222.
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It also used arguments similar to some of the revisionists' 
to propose tbat if the whole body of the Treaty rested on 
this myth of German guilt, then, If ••• tbe foundation is as 
n20rotten as tbe superstructure. The editorial concluded 
by calling for an autboritative study of tbe entire issue 
to be carried out not by lawyers but by historians to "open 
21
archives, bear evidence, and form conclus ions. II Words 
such as these could only enbance the newly discovered 
historical evidence being published. 
An article by Emile Cammaerts for the Edinburgh 
Review evaluated how far destruction of the "myth" had 
progressed by comparing the popular view of the origins of 
the war held in 1914 with those held in April, 1925. For 
Great Britain, the major issue--overshadowing all otbers-­
bad been the defense of Belgian neutrality; and it symbol­
ized the conflict between might versus international 
compacts. But Cammaerts believed that by 1925 the in­
vasion of Belgium was no longer thought of as the principal 
reason for war but merely a subsidiary issue. Today, be 
concluded, most writers blamed the revival of nationalism 
in the Balkans, the break-up of the Dual Monarchy, the 
rivalry of interests and armaments between the two groups 
of powers struggling for hegemony in Europe as the real 
20Ibid ., p. 221. 
21 Ibid ., p. 222. 
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reasons for the war. Cammaerts finished his article with 
a thrust at the Peace Settlement, tying the question of 
blame to its credibility, and suggesting that if the main 
moral principle underlying the Treaty was challenged or 
changed, there would be a great effect on the diplomatic 
structure of Europe. 23 There is little doubt that the contro­
versy surrounding Article 231 had become linked to the 
revisionists' conclusions whether originally intended by 
the historians or not. Enough of them had explicitly 
appealed for a reassessment of the entire question of "war 
guilt" to have provided justification for relating the two 
issues. Therefore, when The New Statesman ran an article 
measuring the public's desire to re-examine this clause, 
it was also partially a measure of the revisionists' impact 
upon their times. The article concluded that by 1925: 
There is also, apparently, a not inconsiderable 
body of opinion in this country which desires 
the question to be reopened with a view to re­
lieving Germany of the moral burden of that 'sole' 
guilt which she formally admitted in Article 231 
of the Treaty of Versailles.24 
Other articles followed a similar pattern: they 
22Emile Cannnaerts, "War Responsibility in 1914 and 
Today," Edinburgh Review, CCXLIV (January, 1925), pp. 39-40. 
23 Ibid ., p. 39. 
24"Responsibil i ty for the War," The New State"sman, 
XXV (October 3, 1925), p. 684. 
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presented favorable reviews of revisionists ideas and 
assailed the moral premises upon which they saw the Treaty 
of Versailles resting.25 One such article, typifying this 
process, appeared in T'he Commonweal. It called for revision 
of the Treaty, indicating that a demand for this action was 
growing in England and America. The findings of Sidney B. 
Fay, Harry Elmer Barnes, and John S. Ewart were then cited 
to support the claim that: 
So long as the Treaty of Versailles contains a 
humiliating and erroneous accusation which up to 
the present time has provided a real hindrance to 
the establishment of peace throughout the world, 26 
so long will confusion and dissatisfaction prevail. 
25Hbrace G. Alexander, "Germanyt s Demand for Equality," 
The Spectator, CLIV (June 21, 1935), pp. 1058-59; Robert C. 
Binkley, "New Light on Russiats War GUilt," Current History, 
XXIII (January, 1926), pp. 531-533, and "Revision of World 
War History," The Historical Outlook, XIX (March, 1928), 
pp. 109-112; Archibald Cary Coolide;e, "Dissatisfied Germany," 
Foreign Affairs, IV (October, 1925), pp. 35-46; Georges
Demartial, IIA Frenchman Lays Blame on France, Russia and 
England} U Current History, XXIII (March, 1926), pp. 787-793; 
Edward l~Iead Earle, "A Wise and UJ?right Story of War Responsi­
bility," The New Republic, LVII (December 5, 1928), pp. 73-75; 
Gunther Frantz, "Did Russian Mobilization Force War in 1914?" 
Current History, XXV (March, 1929), pp. 852-858; H. W. M., 
"The Question of Responsibility," The Nation and the Athenaeum, 
XXX (October 29, 1921), pp. 171-173; Charles Seymour t "Questions of War Responsibility," Yale Re!iew, XII (July, 1924), pp. 790­
794; "The Blunder and the Way:'Otit,~ The Nation, XXVI \February 
14, 1920), pp. 661-662; "War-Guilt Myths," The Living Age,
CCCXV (October 28, 1922), pp. 218-222; "The Responsibility for 
the War," The New Statesman, XXV (October 3, 1925), pp. 684­
685; Editorial, ~e New Statesman, XXVI (October 17, 1925),
J? 100; "England and France,fi The New Statesman, XXXII 
(November 24, 1928), pp. 216-217. 
26M• M. Hoffman, "Multifold War Guilt," The Commonweal, 
XIII (April 29, 1931), pp. 708-709. 
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The article concluded with the suggestion that deletion of 
Article 231 would remove the obstacles preventing Germany, 
Austria, and Hungary from standing on the "same civilized 
Christian plane with other nations of Europe.,,27 
The settlement reached at Versailles continued to 
lose prestige throughout the decade. Articles such as the 
one appearing in ~he Saturday Review of Literature judged 
the entire thing "shameful and disastrous," and called 
Article 231 the clause that "surpassed all others in shame, " 
and "a lie of such grossness.,,28 Meanwhile, Germany was 
referred to as "a gallant and vanquished enemy.1I 29 Another 
journal reiterated this theme, insisting: "It is growing 
clear that it is not merely the details, but the whole 
foundation of the Versailles settlement which must be 
challenged •••• ,,30 The purpose of calling the entire Treaty 
into question, the editorial asserted, lay in its starting 
assumption found in Article 231 which had provided the 
~llies with the means for " ••• coercing Germany into accepting 
'the responsibility for causing all the loss and damage, 
which the Allies had suffered as a consequence of the war •••• ,,,31 
27Ibid • 
28Henry W. Nevinson, "The Great Revision," The Saturday 
Review	 of Literature, III (November 20, 1926), p. 309. 
29 Ibid • 
30"War Guilt Myths," The Living Age, CCCXV (October 
28, 1922), p. 218. 
31 Ibid • 
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But the significance of the revisionists would not 
end here. As an article in the January 1929 issue of 
Review of Reviews predicted, 11 •••what these men do so quietly 
will in time shake to the foundations the political 
alignment of Europe, founded as it is on the Peace Treaties 
of 1919. 1132 This statement proved to be prophetic in the 
coming decade. 
As Britain's preoccupation with the problems of Anglo-
German relations increased, politicians and statesmen could 
not ignore the public's growing sympathy for German 
challenges to the Treaty--Iegal or otherwise--when preparing 
a viable foreign policy. And it was in this realm that the 
works of the revisionist historians produced their greatest 
impact. 
3211Summary of Sidney Fay's Origins of the War," 
Review of Reviews, LXXIX (January, 1928), p. 90. 
CHAPTER III 
BRITISH POLITICS TO THE RHINELAND CRISIS 
When Hitler marched troops into the Rhineland in 
1936, the British public viewed with tolerant acceptance 
this clear breach of the Versailles Treaty. There were 
1 
many reasons to account for such a mild reaction. But 
one of the most important was the impact of the revisionist 
historians on the intellectual climate of the times. Their 
findings helped to shape a series of views--dislike of the 
Treaty, guilt over the mistreatment of Germany, sympathy 
for her goals, and mistrust of France--upon which a pro-
German attitude came to be predicated. In this chapter 
the effects of such sentiments on the direction of British 
foreign policy during the crucial years prior to remilita­
rization will be analyzed. 
Many observers have noted this development of sympathy 
1Malcolm Muggeridge, The Thirties: 1930-1940 in Great 
Britain, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1940); Thomas Jones, A 
Diar With Letters: 19 1-1950, (Oxford University Press,­
195 ; James Ramsay Montague Butler, Lord Lothian Phili 
Kerr 1882-1940 (London: MacMillan and Co. t., 9 0 ; 
Alfred Leslie Rowse, Appeasement: A study in Political 
Decline 1933-193, (New York: W. W. Worton and Co. Inc., 
19 1 ; aron L. Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland: Britain, 
France and the Rhineland." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Indiana University, 1967. 
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for Britain's former enemy. One historian wrote that 
these feelings sprang from illusions harbored during the 
inter-war period that "Germany had not 'really' started the 
war of 1914; Germany had been 'crushed' by the Versailles 
Treaty, which was in all respects vengeful and unjust •••• 112 
Harold MacMillan, a young backbencher at the time, agreed 
that Britain did have a guilt complex, " ••• a feeling that 
3Germany had a rough time. 11 Elaborating on this idea, 
he wrote: 
••• there was a still more powerful force operating 
on the British conscience. We were uneasy about 
Germany and her treatment since the end of the 
war •••• The Treaty of Versailles was no sooner 
framed then it came under powerful attack.4 
Moreover, MacMillan explicitly referred to the revisionist 
history being published as one cause for the confused 
opinion over Germany which, he claimed, helped to produce 
the weak and indeterminant policy followed in the 1930's.5 
One concrete method for ameliorating this sense of 
wrongdoing, suggested by countless writers, was to revise 
or remove the Treaty entirely. Underlying this view was 
2Lewis Oharles Bernard Seaman, Life in Britain Between 
the Wars, English Life Series, ed. Peter Quennell, (London: 
B. T. Batsford, 1970), p. 191. 
3Harold MacMillan, Winds of Ch~e, Vol. I of Memoirs, 
(3 vols., New York: Harper and Row, 1~), pp. 350-351. 
4Ibid ., pp. 348-349. 
5Ibid ., pp. 348-350. 
3? 
the belief that " ••• the elimination of justified causes of 
dissatisfaction and resentment would be a means of ad­
justing the balance of power.,,6 There was also evidence 
that the British Government faced considerable public 
pressure to make these principles of 'justice' the basis 
of practical policy considerations.? Echoing this call 
for Treaty revision throughout the thirties, British 
journals also joined in decrying the Versailles Settlement 
8 
as a great obstacle to peace. 
It was only a small step from these general, amorphous 
feelings of sympathy for Germany to the philosophy of appease­
ment which originated during the 1920's and beeame British 
policy in the 1930's. Prior to Hitler's coming to power 
four reasons existed for appeasement. First was a belief 
in a "special Anglo-German affinity •••whose origins went 
back to the days when Angles and Saxons set off in the 
o
wattle boats ••• a unity of blood •••a."close cultural association.";; 
6Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars: 
Conflictin Strate ies of Peace Since Versailles, (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940 , p. 222. 
?Ibid., pp. 216-217. 
8S• K. Ratcliffe, "Ourselves and the NevI Germany," 
Contemporary Revievl, CLXIV (September, 1933), p. 270; "Herr 
Hitler and Versailles," The Spectator, CLIV ,May 17, 1935), 
pp. 824-825. 
9Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, PPQ 142-143. 
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Second was general recognition of a 
••• shared Anglo-German responsibility in the 
outbreak of war--a belief fostered by Britisb 
historians and encouraged by German propa­
ganda, casting doubt on the morality of Britain's 
actions in 1914, and leading to tbe question: 
'Could Britain, by a different foreign policy 
have averted an Anglo-German clash?'10 
Third, appeasement seemed justified by the alleged severity 
of Versailles, a major cause of German bitterness. And 
finally, it sprang from a desire to find an alternative to 
a pro-Frencb policy, out of fear France would use Britain 
to keep Germany weak. The growth of pacifism in reaction 
to tbe borrors of the First War and the economic policies 
of tbe British Government which was anxious to restore 
normal trade relations with the profitable German market 
also contributed to the acceptance of this policy. But 
in order to succeed as a philosophy, appeasement needed to 
buttress tbe pragmatic considerations of political necessity 
with tbe prestige of scholarly research provided by tbe 
11historian. And the revisionists were welcome in tbe 
attainment of "an Anglo-German rapprochement, even an 
Anglo-German alliance. 1I12 
All through the inter-war years tbis policy exerted 
10Ibid •
 
11Ibid., pp. 165-166.
 
12Martin Gilbert and Ricbard Gott, Tbe Appeasers.
 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963), p. 41. 
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13Neville 
Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930's, (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 197 
14Ibid ., p. 28" 
15Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, p. 147" 
16Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers, p. 2. 
to devise effective alternatives to government positions; 
Nevertheless, at no time did a complete consensus 
over foreign policy exist. According to Neville Thompson 
in all social classes. It became an It ••• a ttitude of mind 
common to many politicians, diplomats, civil servants, 
when dissent occurred, it was sporadic and came from indi­
base to embrace adherents from all political parties and 
historians, journalists, industrialists, businessmen, 
shopkeepers, students, workers and housewives. 1l15 
number of reasons for this failure: first, it was difficult 
vidual critics and small cliques; no cohesive group formed 
until after Eden resigned in 1938. 16 Thompson gives a 
who has done a study of the opposition to appeasement, 
also attracted radicals and pacifists who denied Germany 
had been solely responsible for the First War and argued 
she had received inequitable treatment at the peace confer­
ence. 14 But after 1933, appeasement moved from this limited 
considerable attraction, appealing to a battle-scarred 
generation " ••• who hoped negotiation and accommodation 
would replace war as a means of settling disputes. u13 It 
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second, the individual views of anti-appeasers about what 
should be done were often too different for them to agree. 
Finally, I'to critic ize an Administration that could present 
its policies in such comforting terms and which commanded 
an overwhelming majority of loyal adherents was no easy task.,,17 
The three leading Conservative backbenehers who did 
object to the direction of British policy in the early 
thirties--Winston Churchill, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and 
Leopold Amery--were too few in number and had no official 
18position in the National Government to implement their views. 
Another bastion of anti-German sentiment, the Foreign Office, 
also tried to change the direction of Anglo-German relations. 
But none of the many warnings issued by its Permanent 
Undersecretary, Lord Vansittart, or Sir Horace Rumbold, 
Britain's Ambassador to Germany until mid-1933, altered 
19significantly the determination of the Cabinet to appease. 
17Ibid., pp. 26,42,45. 
18Ibid., pp. 23-25. 
19Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, Vol. I of 
The Second World War, (6 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1948), p. 81; John Connell (pseud) John Henry Robertson, The 
'Office': The Star of the British Forei n Office: 1919-1951, 
New York: St. Marin's Press, 19 8 ,pp. 20,243; Gordon A. 
Craig and Felix Gilbert, ads., The Diplomats: 1919-1939, Vols. I 
and II Atheneum (2 vols., New York: Princeton University Press, 
1953), pp. 15-48, 438-447; William Newton Medlicott, Britain 
and Germ : The Search for A reement 1930-1937, (University 
of London: The Athlone Press, 19 9 , p. 3; Robert Vansittart, 
The Mist Procession: The Autobio ra h of Lord Vansittart, 
London: Rutc ison and Co. Ltd., 958, pp. 222-223; Great 
Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 
1919-1939, 2nd. ser., Vbl. XII. 
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Ignoring these protests, the men who came to power 
in the election of 1931--a triumph for the Conservative 
Party--proved willing to tolerate revisions of the Treaty.20 
In the election of 1935, which retained the National
 
Government in power under Stanley Baldwin's leadership, the
 
process of accepting German abrogations of Treaty provisions
 
continued. 21 It is in the context of these developments
 
that the Rhineland crisis must be understood: not as an
 
isolated incident but as part of a pattern of events aimed
 
at destroying the status quo set up at Versailles. For
 
example, allowing Hitler to rearm, and then giVing this
 
action a certain amount of legitimacy with the announcement
 
of an Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June, 1935, only
 
encouraged him to challenge other provisions. In addition,
 
the Nazi dictator took heart from British and French
 
failures to bring Mussolini to account, the League of Nations'
 
20Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Year~ Memoirs, 1931-1945, 
Vol. II (2 vols., London: Fredrick Muller Ltd., 1957), p. 22, 
and "The Present Situation," The Political Quarterly, VI 
(July, 1935), pp. 327-329; Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, p. 107; 
MacMillan, Winds of Change, p. 341; Fredrick Edwin Smith, 
Halifax: The Life of Lord Halifax, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1965), p. 339; Elaine Windrich, British Labour's Foreign 
POliC\, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952), 
pp. 2 -22; Leonard Woolf, "Labour's Foreign PolicY,ll Political 
Quarterly, IV (October, 1933), pp. 506-507; Wolfers, Britain 
and France Between Two Ware, p. 214. 
21 The Times, (London), House of Commons: 1935, (London: 
The Times Office, 1935), p. 23; Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, 
pp. 149-150; Medlicott, Britain and Germany: The Search for 
Agreement, Pp. 15-16; "Forward," New Statesman and Nation, 
VIII (September 29, 1934), pp. 415-419. 
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growing impotence, Italy's preoccupation with Africa, and 
Anglo-French diSarray.22 
The collapse of the Hoare-Laval Plan and the entire 
Abyssinian issue had severely weakened Britain's position 
in a number of ways. At home Baldwin's reputation slumped, 
the episode nearly costing the Prime Minister his political 
life; and according to Churchill, "It shook Parliament and 
the nation to its base. u23 Abroad, Germany deduced from 
Hoare's disgrace that Britain was unwilling to go to war 
to support her proclaimed rights and responsibilities, 
causing the Nazis to feel contempt for the British. 
Meanwhile, the French felt isolated and betrayed. 24 
With the climate thus favorable for another dramatic 
move, Hitler began to search for a new pretext to dismantle 
Versailles further. And France's determination to ratify 
the Franco-Soviet Pact, negotiated the previous year, gave 
him the excuse he needed. On February 28, in Paris, the 
Chamber of Deputies voted in favor of the Treaty; the next 
day, in Berlin, the French Ambassador received instructions 
to approach the German Government about the basis for 
22Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators Vol. II of 
The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, {Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Col, 1962), pp. 370-371. 
23Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 185. 
24Connell, The 'Office', pp. 218-221. 
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general negotiations for a Franco-German understanding. 
Hitler asked for a few days to think about the French 
suggestion. Then, on Saturday morning, March 7, 1936, 
Herr von Nuerath, the German Foreign Minister, summoned 
the British, French, Belgian, and Italian ambassadors to 
the Wilhelmstrasse and offered proposals for a twenty-five 
year pact, demilitarization on both sides of the Rhine 
frontier, limiting of air forces, and non-aggression pacts 
to be negotiated with Germany's Eastern and Western neighbors. 
On the same day, ~o hours after these offers, Hitler 
announced to the Reichstag Germany's intention to reoccupy 
the Rhineland. As Hitler was speaking, 35,000 soldiers 
crossed the boundary and entered all the main German towns 
where they were received everywhere with rejoicing. 
Britain and France had many reasons for moving 
directly and forcefully against Germany. First, strategic 
considerations impelled the Western Democracies to retain 
the demilitarized zone in order to come to the aid of 
France's Eastern allies in case of an attack. Legally, 
both the Versailles and Locarno Treaties entitled them to 
25
repel Germany from this zone. Furthermore, should Hitler 
succeed in making good the coup, sanctity of all treaties 
25Wolfers, Britain and France Between ~o Wars, pp. 42, 
45,50. 
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would be jeopardized and the League weakened even more. 
The Democracies would be discredited: their prestige 
already damaged after the failure to apply sanctions in 
Ethiopia. And French morale would be lowered by British 
reluctance to support her in what she considered a legiti­
mate enterprise. Finally, by allowing Hitler to win so 
easily, a pattern for future Nazi gain would be established, 
and the dictator earn a much needed success to enable him 
to carry out other illegal acts. 
In spite of the reasons for moving decisively 
26
against Hitler, Eden and the National Government temporized. 
Explanations for Britain's failure to support France at 
this crucial time have been many and varied. Treaty viola­
tions were nothing new, and modifications of Versailles had 
occurred frequently in an atmosphere of "tacit acquiescence. 1I27 
Foreign Office documents indicate that Britain had long 
been expecting remilitarization and preferred to view this 
concession as a bargaining chip to gain diplomatic advantages 
and not as the last opportunity to overthrow the Nazi regime. 28 
26Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates 
(House of Commons), 5~ ser., Vol. 309 (24 Feb.-13 Mar., 1936), 
pp. 1814-1817; Eden, Facing the Dictators, p. 381. 
27William Norton Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. 
Lambert, eds., Documents on British Forei Polic 1919­
1939, Second Series, XII London: Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1972), pp. 149-150. 
28Medlicott, Britain and Germany: The Search for 
Agreement, p. 24. 
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Moreover, the deplorable situation of British armaments 
during the early thirties cannot be ignored. 29 But it 
was the mood of the public more than anything else that 
was cited by those in power as the motive behind Government 
reluctance to use force. Many officials shared a genuine 
belief that British sentiment favored Germany in this 
instance, and they hesitated to implement any policy 
which might risk a war. 
29Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 71; Eden, 
Facing the Dictators, p. 396. 
CHAPTER IV 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO HITLER'S COUP 
Although the Rhineland crisis lasted several weeks, 
there was little controversy over what direction the 
Government should take. Few people considered war desir­
able at this time; and the largest segment of public opinion 
favored Germany once more established in her own territory.1 
The real issue turned on how to restore a feeling of securi­
ty to the continent and eliminate danger of Eritish in­
volvement in a potential conflict between France and 
Germany. No doubt many political, diplomatic, and military 
considerations entered into the decision to appease Hitler; 
yet, the mood of the Eritish people was the reason given 
by most officials for pursuing this course. The evidence 
indicates that many members of the Government shared the 
public's sympathy with German attempts to revise an un­
popular Treaty, agreeing that it lacked the moral authority 
to insure enforcement of its provisions. 
1In a poll conducted by the Daily Express, 55% 
favored the German position while only 24% favored the 
French, and 21% were not interested. See Samuel H. Cuff, 
The Face of War: 1931-1942, (New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 
1942), p. 26. 
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As Prime Minister and elder statesman of the 
Conservative Party, Stanley Baldwin exerted influence on 
the formulation of foreign policy. In the twenties, Baldwin 
had been a Francophile and " ••• certainly not in sympathy 
with the facile denegration of France common among the pro­
German faction in Britain.,,2 Nevertheless, Baldwin was 
extremely reluctant to join France in any strong measures 
against Germany in the Rhineland. As he indicated to M. 
Flandin when voicing the Cabinet's hesitation over supporting 
France, his decision came from a conviction: 
' ••• if there is even one chance in a hundred that 
war would follow your police operation, I have not 
the right to commit England •••England is not in a 
state to go to war.'13 
According to Baldwin, the public favored Germany's right to 
enter and occupy the Rhineland; therefore, he could not risk 
any action that might jeopardize the peace. Only with 
reserve did the Prime Minister support Eden in initiating 
staff talks with France in the face of a public Il' ... half 
convinced that secret conversations were the cause of the 
Firs t War •••• 1,,4 
2Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biograp~y, 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p. 181. 
3Stanley Baldwin as quoted in Connell, The'Office', p.238. 
4Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography, p. 920, 
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Witbin Baldwin's Cabinet, little entbusiasm existed 
for aiding France. Tbe majority thought it " •••wbolly 
unreasonable to use force to resist a German occupation of 
the Rhineland •.. Germany had a case for doing as she wished. II5 
While discussing the events of Marcb 7, they expressed only 
slight displeasure witb Hitler's goals, reserving criticism 
for the metbods be had used. In a speech on foreign policy, 
. 
Viscount Halifax actually commended Hitler's desire to put 
troops into tbe Rhineland. He did not find it difficult 
" ••• to understand the German claim to establisb full 
sovereignty over German soil.,,6 The Lord Chancellor only 
admonished Hitler for weakening Britisb sympathy over 
German aims by sucb a flagrant, brutal display of force. 
In Halifax's judgement, Germany could probably have achieved 
7tbe same objective by reason. In a similar vein, Chancellor 
of the Excbequer Neville Chamberlain approved of gratifying 
German desires for expansion, and he proposed to save the 
peace	 by offering a colony to Germany.8 
With more vigor tban the Cabinet bad exhibited, members 
5Ibid., p. 914. 
6Viscount Halifax, Speeches on Foreign Policy, ed. 
H. H.	 E. Craster, (London: Oxford University Press~ 1940), 
p.	 35, and Fulness of Days, (London: Collins, 1957). 
7Ibid ., pp. 35-39. 
8MacMillan, Winds of Change, p. 427. 
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of Parliament debated this issue both inside and outside 
the House of Commons. While complete agreement never 
occurred, a considerable portion of the members did appear 
willing to accept German entrance into the Rhineland. One 
MP's letter to The Times called for substitution of the 
German peace proposals in place of the Treaty of Versailles 
which had been erected on "the sands of resentment, fear, 
1I9and revenge. This became the frequently repeated theme 
in the weeks after March 7. Lord Allen of Hurtwood, an 
active pacifist since World War I, a firm supporter of the 
League and collective security, and an advocate of justice 
to Germany by revision of the Treaty, also wrote to The 
Times about the "splendid opportunity" offered by the crisis. 
He feared the chance might be missed to solve simultaneously 
the inseparable problems of equality, security, and treaty 
revision, and urged Britain not to repeat "the tragic 
mistakes of the past.,,10 Another MP Sir Arnold Wilson, 
speaking before The 1912 Club of London, proposed taking 
Hitler at his word and making every effort to get France 
and Belgium to accept his new offer because "sooner or 
11 later an outlet must be found for crermany." Three days 
to 
9The Times (London),
the Editor from T. C. R. 
March 17, 1936, 
Moore, MP. 
p. 12. Letter 
10The Times (London), March 11, 1936, p. 17. 
11 Ibid • 
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later, Wilson urged an end to harping over Hitler's vio­
lation of the Locarno Treaty, remarking that in the past 
twenty years treaty after treaty had been broken when no 
12longer acceptable to public opinion. 
More often, however, people preferred to discount 
the Peace Settlement rather than Locarno when rationalizing 
Hitler's action. If Versailles could be proven invalid, 
then remilitarization would no longer be construed a vio­
lation of its provisions. This may explain why Lord 
Londonderry, an advocate of appeasement, attacked the 
Treaty so strongly a few days after the crisis began: 
The Treaty of Versailles can properly be said to 
have shown itself to be a dO~UMnt of singular 
ineptitude. It disregarded the majority of 
those principles which would guide victors in 
imposing conditions on the vanquished, and the 
sooner that treaty is buried and tne Covenant 
of the League of Nations freed from its baneful 
influence the better for the peace of Europe •••• 
The occupation of the demilitarized zone is a 
logical sequence to recent events.13 
One phrase extremely popular at this time, "they are 
only going into their own back yards,,,14 reflected the lens 
through which most people chose to view the Rhineland issue. 
Few cared to remember that Hitler had broken international 
law. And Lord Lothian's slogan provided a means for absolving 
12The Times (London), March 14, 1936, p. 14. 
13The Times (London), March 12, 1936, p. 15. 
14Butler, Lord Lothian, pp. 212-213. 
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German action of its offensiveness by placing it in a 
harmless sounding context. 
Although members of the ~overnment actively diseussed 
this issue in public speeches and the Press, they had no 
opportunity for debate within the House of Commons until 
March 26. Two days after the event, Eden informed Commons 
about the latest German coup and impending Government action, 
but he requested no debate for a fortnight. Instead, he 
responded briefly during "question and answer period" to 
developments in negotiations. Observing reaction to Eden's 
news, Harold Nicolson recorded in his diary that the general 
mood of the House was one of fear: "Anything to keep out 
of war. 1,15 Because of this predisposition, MP 1s of all 
parties were content to leave matters to the Government. 
Even Churchill, a harsh critic of appeasement, did not speak 
out immediately because Baldwin was considering him for 
Minister of Defense--a post which eventually went to Sir 
Thomas Inskip.16 
At last, on March 20, the Foreign Secretary made a 
lengthy speech covering diplomatic actions taken since 
March 7, and stressed willingness to accept remilitarization 
15Harold Nicolson, Diaries and Letters, 1930-1939, 
Vol. II, ed. Nigel Nicolson, (3 vols., New York: Atheneum, 
1966), p. 248. 
16Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers, pp. 107-108. 
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as a fait accompli in order to rebuild the shattered peace 
a.nd lost confidence. 17 He recounted a series of diplomatic 
manoeuvres made under the aegis of the Locarno Powers and 
Council of the League, aimed at resolving the crisis 
satisfactorily.18 Two days after Eden's speech, Nacolson 
once more described the 'pro-German' attitude in the House 
which he adduced to mean "afraid of war.,,19 
Then, on March 16, nineteen days after the event, 
debate commenced. But by this time, nothing that might 
have been said in the Commons would have made a great deal 
of difference. 20 Eden began discussion, summarizing the 
entire British position regarding the Rhineland and her 
obligations under Locarno: Versailles was mentioned only 
once. 
21 He then reviewed all diplomacy since M~rch 7, 
once more indicating the matter be considered a fait 
accompli so rebuilding of lost confidence could proceed. 22 
The speech concluded with a list of the country's goals: 
17Great	 Britain Parliament, Parliamentary Debates 
5lli(House	 of Commons), Ser., Vol. 310 (16 Mar.-9 Apr., 1936), 
p.	 846. 
18Ibid ., pp. 847-848. 
19Nicolson, Diaries, p. 254, and "Has Britain a Policy?" 
Foreign Affairs, XIV (July, 1936), pp. 549-562. 
20Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers, pp. 107-108. 
21Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates, 
(House of Cbmmons), 5~ ser., Vbl. 310 (16 Mar.-9 Apr., 1936), 
pp. 1440-1445. 
22 Ibid • 
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recognition of British obligations to Locarno, prevention 
of war, creation of conditions for negotiation, str~hening 
of collective security, and encouragement of Germany's 
return to the League so that "in a happier atmosphere" 
larger matters of economics and armaments can be discussed 
since they are "indispensable to the appeasement of Europe.,,2 3 
Eden later estimated that the reaction to his proposals was 
even better than expected: "the House was understanding and 
the majority of Members was fervent in support. 1I24 
Then, debate over these matters ensued. Hugh Dalton, 
speaking for Labour, took little notice of ~ermany's provoc­
ative action; instead, he condemned British policy for pro­
posing an international peace keeping force, staff consul­
tations with France and Belgium, and negotiating with the 
Locarno Powers separately from the League. 25 Dalton insisted 
on the German's right to equality--political and economic-­
26
and urged that country to return to the League. No other 
course was feasible because, in Dalton's estimation, 
23Ibid ., p. 1450.
 
24Eden , Facing the Dictators, p. 407.
 
25Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates
 
5ili(House of Commons), ser., Vol. 310 (16 Mar.-9 Apr., 1936), 
pp. 1453-1456. 
26 Ibid., p. 1459. 
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••• public opinion in this country, would not 
support and certainly the Labour party would 
not support, the taking of military sanctions 
against Germany at this time, in order to put 
German troops out of the Rhineland.27 
Moreover, he asserted, public opinion drew a clear dis­
tinction between actions taken by Mussolini, labeling them 
aggression, and actions taken by Herr Hitler. This was 
because in the latter instance they had occurred within 
the frontiers of the German Reich. 28 Clement Attlee, 
leader of the Labour Party and traditionally hostile to 
treaty revision, disagreed with Dalton, objecting to making 
any retribution to Germany for suffering from the "evils 
of Versailles.,,29 
The controversy persisted with those desiring to 
appease the Nazis alluding to the unfair Peace Settlement 
to justify this view. Even Lloyd-George, who had helped 
to negotiate the Treaty, had come to shift his position in 
favor of revision. He explained that " ••• you cannot treat 
this as if it were Holy Writ," which only weakened the 
document further.30 Next, Sir Archibald Sinclair joined in 
the discussion, reasoning that since Germany had already 
broken the I1 s ilackles of Versailles,11 we ought to have 
27 Ibid ., pp. 1457-1458. 
28Ibid •
 
29
Ibid., pp. 1535-1536.
 
30Ibid., p. 1477.
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struck them off before now. He then urged that the 
opportunity for real peace should not be allowed to pass 
by ignoring Hitler's proposals. 31 
While some members opposed Government policy, they 
did not materially influence its direction. And even those 
against appeasement agreed with Churchill's observation 
that a general consensus in favor of Eden and the Government 
existed within the House. 32 As an alternative, Churchill 
proposed pursuing collective security, and if that failed, 
making an alliance with France. 33 Harold Nicolson strongly 
supported strengthening ties with France, and during a 
speech before Commons, he traced the paradox of British 
policy. In the years after the ~r, when Germany had been 
weak, any benefits given to her had been criticized. HUt 
now that Germany had become strong, "there is a great wave 
of pro-German feeling at this moment sweeping the country.,,34 
When it was his turn to speak, another opponent of the 
present policy, Robert Boothby, suggested sympathy was due 
"very largely to a reaction on the part of our people 
against a foreign policy in which they have never believed, 
and which was carried out in a manner which they thought 
31 Ibid ., pp. 1461-1468. 
32Ibid., pp. 1528-1535. 
33Ibid • 
34Ibid ., p. 1473. 
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was grossly unfair to Germany •••• ,,35 Boothby seemed to 
infer that people's gUilt over past mistakes had clouded 
their judgement about the Nazi regime, thereby inducing 
an inade~uate response to Hitler's breach of the Treaty. 
Opposition to the policies outlined by Eden could 
also be found within the Foreign Office. Churchill's 
friend Ralph Wigram clearly saw the inherent dangers of 
appeasement. And after Hitler's coup, he predicted: "'War 
is now inevitable, and I think it will be the most terrible 
war there has been •••• ",36 Meanwhile, at the annual dinner 
of the Cambridge University Conservative Association, a few 
days after Hitler's dramatic move, another outspoken critic 
Austen Chamberlain sharply called the dictator to account 
for Violating Locarno and Versailles. Emphatically he 
denied the German view that the Treaties ought not to be 
respected; Chamberlain insisted Britain must uphold the 
law. 37 But the time was not yet ripe for these critics; 
their ranks were thin, and their arguments calling for 
adherence to treaties and resumption of a traditional 
foreign policy aimed at restoring the balance of power 
found no receptive audience in 1936. 
35 Ibid., p. 1497.
 
36Connell, The 'Office', pp. 239-240.
 
37The Times (London), March 12, 1936, p. 8.
 
CHAPTER V 
PRESS REACTION 
The British press, led by The Times, played a crucial 
role in helping to drown out the warnings issued by critics 
of appeasement. It supported the Government and adhered to 
a position that remilitarization was inevitable sooner or 
later. Therefore, while not condoning Hitler's action, 
newspapers urged Britain to be ready to seize the opportunity 
of wresting good from evil. 1 One reason for promoting this 
opinion was that "both financially and intellectually it 
was unwise or impossible for the British Press to adopt 
a strongly critical line ••• the readers did not want to 
read it and the intellectuals did not want to write it.,,2 
In fact, many English journalists and editors, impressed 
by the historians' views on this matter, felt that the 
harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty entitled the Nazis to 
the benefit of the doubt. tilt even made some commentators 
willingto excuse 'these things' as being 'inevitable' 
consequences of the Allied policies of revenge at what 
1Franklin Reid Gannon, The British Press and Germany: 
1936-1939, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 98. 
2Ibid., p. 2. 
57 
58 
should have been the peace table •••• ,,3 
Undoubtedly The Times was the most important British 
paper in the thirties. 4 In foreign affairs it acted as the 
spokesman for the National Government, molded public 
opinion, and served as a barometer for officials to judge 
the mood of the country. Thus its influence rebounded in 
many directions, and the paper's editorial position toward 
Germany and militarization is worth a close study. 
Geoffrey Dawson, editor from 1923-1941, had complete 
authority for foreign affairs. A supporter of appeasement, 
he kept close ties to the Foreign Office and periodically 
went there to talk with Eden over many topics relating to 
national security. In the days following Hitler's coup, 
Dawson met the Foreign Secretary a number of times and also 
Lord Halifax who was closely involved in negotiations over 
the Rhineland, and thereby conversant with official policy.5 
Robert M. Barrinton-Ward, Dawson's assistant editor, was 
another advocate of appeasement and believer in the 
6perniciousness of the Treaty of Versailles. Together 
3Brigitte Granzow, A Mirror of Nazism: British Opinion 
and the Emergence of Hitler, 1929-1933, (London: ~ictor 
Gollancz Ltd., 1964), p. 14. 
4Gannon , The British Press and Germa~y, p. 56 Q 
5John Evelyn Wrench, Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times,
 
(London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1955), p. 330,332.
 
6Gannon, The British Press and GermaQy, p. 56. 
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these two men were mainly responsible for the editorials 
that appeared in the days succeeding Hitler's entry. 
One of the best known of these editorials, cited 
often to represent British reluctance over antagonizing 
Germany appeared two days after the event. Titled IIA 
Chance to Rebuild, I' the editorial took a sympathetic view 
of the coup. First it called for a careful examination of 
the peace proposals Hitler had made; then it made a dis­
tinction between Versailles and Locarno. In The Times~ 
estimation, the original Peace Settlements contained 
"penal and discriminatory clauses" and needed to be done 
away with because they continued to preserve " ••• the mood 
of war-bitterness and war-exhaustion in which they were 
drafted, maintained an unstable equilibrium and threatened 
the durability of the Settlement as a whole.,,7 Only Locarno 
should be retained and its provisions honored. 
But there were people who refused to disregard the 
Treaty of Versailles in this matter. As Arnold Wolfers has 
shown, it clearly stated in Articles 42, 43, and 44 the 
right of France and Britain to prevent Germany from con­
structing fortifications, maintaining armed forces, or 
holding military manoeuvres of any kind in an area " ••• on 
the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west 
7The Times (London), March 9, 1936, p. 15. 
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of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine. n8 
Although Locarno guaranteed these frontiers too, it also 
made a separation between flagrant and non-flagrant breaches 
of Articles 42 and 43, and only in the first case did 
France have the right of immediate and independent action 
with a British promise of assistance. In a non-flagrant 
case, the matter would be referred to the League. Thus, 
much to France's distress, she found out during this crisis 
that if Britain did not wish to take a hard line against 
Hitler, the Government could portray his action as non­
flagrant. 9 This argument was an important motive for 
directing new attacks against the Treaty of Versailles, 
which by 1936, had lost so much of its authority. 
The Times concluded with a justification of Hitler's 
move, explaining that he was only marching into German 
territory, and carried pictures of cheering and enthusiastic 
crowds welcoming the troops as evidence. 10 It finished with 
a plea to use this opportunity to strengthen the peace of 
Europe, claiming that the old structure, " ••• one-sided and 
unbalanced, is nearly in ruins. It is the moment not to 
despair, but to rebuild. 1I11 Ending Versailles and restoring 
8Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars, p. 42. 
9Ibid., p. 45. 
10The Times (London), March 9, 1936), p. 18. 
11 Ibid ., p. 15. 
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Germany to a position of equality became the cornerstone 
of the paper's editorial policy vi8-a~vis Anglo-German 
relations during this tense period. 
With The Times leading the way, most of Britain's 
newspapers expressed their belief in the sincerity of 
12Hitler's offer of a non-aggression pact. The Daily 
Herald contended that due to the unfair, inequitable 
treatment meted out to Germany, the British people would 
not fight to prevent JlGerman troops from garrisoning 
German to~rns.,,13 The same article also urged the League 
Council, when it met, to devote itself " •••not to recrimi­
nation and useless snarling, but to the constructive task 
of making, with this as the opportunity, a new, more 
14equitable, and, therefore, more lasting settlement ... ·
Implicit in this charge was the view that prior ones had 
been less than fair to Germany. Lord Rothmore's Daily 
Mail had from the outset an admiration for the internal 
accomplishments of the Nazi regime, both spiritual and 
material. 15 Therefore, it was no surprise to find an 
editorial stance highly sympathetic to Hitler's move. 
12Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 58. 
13Daily Herald as quoted in The Times (London), 
March 10, 1936, p. 18. 
14Ibid • 
15Gannon, The British Press and Germany, p. 32. 
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The paper called on Britain to face the situation "without 
agitation. It has caused no crisis, and in reality has 
made no substantial change in conditions.,,16 Denying 
emphatically the possibility of British involvement in 
the crisis, Lord Beaverbrook's Daily Express, the world's 
largest single daily, wrote: "Will Britain be involved in 
war? The answer is NO!,,17 Another Beaverbrook paper, the 
Evening Standard, took an even firmer pro-German stand, 
portraying the situation in these dramatic terms: 
Britain has awakened from a nightmare. She finds 
herself blessedly free of a Pact, which, lightly 
undertaken, was a constant menace to her hope of 
peace and prosperity ••••Let us start fresh.18 
Germany was not perceived as a threat at this time. 
Even those papers not usually considered favorable 
to the Nazis were surprisingly mild on the issue of remili­
tarization. One of these, the Morning Post, carried the 
extreme right wing Tory line toward international affairs, 
19seeing Bolshevism and Nazism equally repugnant. 
Nevertheless, in this case it appealed for British statesmen 
to consider the German proposals "with cool heads, since 
16Daily Mail as quoted in ~he Times (London), March 
10, 1936, p. 18. 
17Dail~ Express as quoted in The Times (London),
March 10, 193 , p. 18. 
18Evening Standard as quoted in The Times (London), 
March 10, 1936, p. 18. 
19Gannon, The British Press and GermaQy, pp. 49-52. 
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there is no alternative to discussion but to thrust the 
German ~oops from the Rhineland by war which is not 
possible even if it were a reasonable proPosition."20 
Another newspaper, the Liberal News Chronicle had a 
21
reputation for annoying the Nazis. And yet, it 
estimated that because of the strongly pro-German tide, 
plus Hitler's offer of terms to rebuild good international 
relations, not a single Englishman would regard the 
occupation " ••• as constituting sufficient ground for sup­
porting French punitive measures against Germany.,,22 
Only the Daily Telegraph, with a large middle class circu­
lation, suggested wariness when examining the memorandum 
containing Hitler's counterproposals of good faith. 23 
Both Sunday papers, The Observer, older and more 
influential despite its small circulation, and the Sunday 
Times, maintained a sympathetic line on almost all German 
matters. The Observer had great contempt for Versailles 
and the whole sys~em of international affairs it represented, 
considering an agreement between England and Germany possible 
20Morning Post as quoted in The Times (London), 
March 10, 1936, p. 18. 
21Gannon, The British Press and Germany, pp. 38-42. 
22News Chronicle as quoted in The Times (London), 
I1arch 10, 1936, p. 18. 
23Dail~ Telegraph as~oted in The Times (London),
March 10, 193 , p. 18. 
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and desirable. 24 Likewise, the Sunday Times was also con­
vinced of the advisability of an Anglo-German rapprochement, 
and the paper's owner, Lord Kemsly, did not hesitate to 
use his influence via his newspaper to smooth the way.25 
In the provinces, the Manchester Guardian, a paper 
with a comparatively small circulation "deserved and en­
joyed an international reputation as the liberal counterpart 
of The Times.,,26 Classified a liberal paper, not beceause 
it spoke for that party, but rather due to "the kind of 
people and intellectuals it attracted both as staff and as 
readers",27 the Guardian illustrated how a paper can become 
the prisoner of its own ideology. It stood committed to 
certain things: the inequity of Versailles, the villainy 
of France, abhorrence of war, and enthusiasm for the 
28Weimar Republic. Given these sentiments, the newspaper 
faced a tremendous dilemma after Hitler acceded to power 
and began demanding changes based on his claim of unjust 
treatment from the peace conference. The intellectual 
difficulties the newspaper encountered in reconciling its 
preconceived views about the Treaty with these claims by 
24Gannon, The British Press and Germany, pp. 51-52. 
25 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
26 Ibid ., p. viii. 
27 Ibid ., pp. 74-79. 
28 Ibid • 
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a dictator it detested indicated the negative impact 
which the revisionist historians could produce on discussions 
of foreign affairs in the 1930's. The paradox facing the 
Guardian grew out of these pre-existing attitudes about 
certain issues which came to control the paper's treatment 
of Germany: 
••• the Manchester Guardian could not deny the justice 
even of a dictator's 'just' demands. The Manchester 
Guardian was in the complicated position of knowing 
what the Nazi regime and its ideas must lead to, but 
being unable to oppose various demands based upon 
what it deemed genuine grievances in which Britain 
had complied at Versailles ••.• 29 
The result was that although the Guardian had a clear 
conception from 1933 onwards of Nazi Germany: 
It could not draw the logical conclusions of this 
insight and was forced, each time it was confronted 
with the continual German heinousness it had always 
predicted, suddenly to urge tolerance and moderation 
either because wa~-was unthinkable, or because no 
one's conscience was wholly clear •••• 30 
A quick glance at other papers outside of London 
revealed a large body of pro-German feeling throughout 
Britain. The Yorkshire Post, Birmingham Post, Liverpool 
Post, Nottingham Guardian, Sheffield Telegraph and North 
Mail, all downgraded the significance of Hitler's move, and 
the Sheffield Telegraph characterized the situation as no 
act of aggression; Germany has " •••merely relieved herself 
29Gannon, The British Press and Germany, p. 78. 
30Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
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of a humiliation by re-occupying her own territory."31 
At the same time, these papers expressed hopes that Hitler's 
proposals receive a cool examination, so that out of bad 
32some good may come. Only a very few papers such as the 
Glasgow Herald and Western Morning News seemed willing to 
take a less conciliatory p0sition, refusing to be bribed 
by the peace proposals and denouncing the unilateral 
abandonment of Versailles and Locarno. 33 
Other segments of the British Press, consisting of 
the weekly, monthly, and quarterly, also acted as an im­
portant forum for public opinion, and in the ensuing months 
much was published on the Nazis' latest move. New Statesman 
and Nation, a liberal journal of political and social 
criticism, within a week after the coup, ran two articles. 
In the first, it estimated that British sentiment, even 
though deploring Hitler's violent methods, accepted his 
moral right to the Rhineland. 34 Starting with this premise, 
the journal then presented an editorial in the same issue, 
using as an example of popular feeling a bus conductor's 
31Sheffield Telegraph as quoted in The Times (London), 
March 10, 1936, p. 18. 
32Birmingham Post, ¥ottingham Guardian, Liverpool 
Post, Yorkshire Post, North Mail, as quoted in The Times 
(London), March 10, 1936, p. 18. 
33Western Morning News, Glasgow Herald, as quoted
 
in The Times (London), March 10, 1936, p. 18.
 
341'The Week-End ReView," New Statesman and Nation, 
XI (March 14, 1936), p. 3b~. 
67 
pronouncement that remilitarization " ••• is no more than 
to move his family into his own back yard.,,35 To explain 
this concept, the editors concluded: 
We all have bad consciences about Germany's 
treatment since the war. England has talked 
of Germany's right to equality in Europe ever 
since she joined with France to deprive her 
of it.36 
The following week another editorial appeared, reiterating 
the same belief that a guilty conscience had produced the 
confusion of British opinion on this matter. It did warn, 
however, that people were too willing to accept the idea 
that once injustices of Versailles had been removed, Europe 
37would know peace. 
The Spectator, a journal offering an independent 
political and cultural approach, found little to be disturbed 
about, and considered it foolish to think German inequality 
could be maintained permanently, " •.• nor is anyone disposed 
to moralise overmmch about Germany's repeated breaking of 
the Treaty of Versailles •••• ,,38 Only the details of re­
storing Germany to her former footing remained to be worked 
35"Is There a Way to Peace?" New Statesman and Nation, 
XI (March 14, 1936), pp. 372-373. 
36Ibid. 
371lBritish Opinion and British Policy," New Statesman
 
and Nation, XI (March 21, 1936), p. 444.
 
38nThe German Challenge," Spectator, eLVI (March 13,
 
1936), pp. 456-457.
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out. Thus, this situation presented an excellent opportunity 
to begin negotiations, based on Hitler's suggestions of a 
Western Pact. 39 The next week, the Spectator once more 
commented that demilitarization was a thing of the past; 
it should be accepted as a fait accompli, and war was out 
of the question in this situation. 40 
Other articles that appeared were repetitious, 
continuing to assert that remilitarization was " ••• no more 
than an emphatic and final repudiation of 'war guilt. ,,,41 
Clearly this jUdgement rested upon the understanding that 
the Peace Conference had committed a real injustice, thereby 
creating a reasonably strong case for restoring German 
equality. The evidence published by the revisionist 
historians, when it was used to sustain this position, 
helped to stimulate a strong sense of guilt in Britain. 
These feelings, in turn, created the desire to make amends 
for the harsh peace that they had helped to impose. 
The link between the revisionist historians and the 
events of March 7, 1936 did not go unnoticed. The liberal 
and literary weekly Christian Century, one of the most 
influential Protestant publications, while searching for 
39Ibid ., p. 456. 
40MGermany and France," Spectator, CLVI (March 27, 1936), 
p. 564. 
41Stephen Gwynn, "British Policy in the Crisis," 
Fortnightly, CXXIX (April, 1936), pp. 385-391. 
69 
a means of reconciling its antipathy for Hitler with its 
equally strong dislike of war, recognized that: 
The whole Versailles program•.• rested upon the 
ascription of the entire responsibility for the 
war to Germany ••••Now if there is one thing 
that has been more definitely proved than an­
other about the World War it is that Germany 
was not solely responsible for it. The pre­
supposition underlying the terms of the Treaty 
was false, Germany knows it, and everybody else 
knows it.42 
Once Versailles had been discredited, Christian Century did 
not think other governments would be averse to Germany 
overthrowing its restrictions. 43 Therefore, in spite of 
the weekly's belief that the Nazi regime was far more danger­
ous than any other, it did not consider it possible " ••• to 
maintain defenses whose moral foundations have so completely 
44crumbled. 11 The only alternative remaining was to support 
revision, the same untenable position of the Manchester 
Guardian. The issue of remilitarization had been resolved 
for the moment; yet, it did not accurately represent either 
the Guardian or the Christian Century's opinion of Nazi 
Germany. But revisionist history, by having provided evidence 
which Germany could adopt to justify her desires for revoking 
provisions of the Treaty, had been instrumental in producing 
favorable press reaction to the disposition of the Rhineland. 
4211Germany Invades the Rhineland," Christian Century, 
LIII (March 18, 1936), p. 422~424. 
43 Ibid • 
44Ibid • 
CHAPTER VI 
TEMPER OF THE TIMES 
Britain's decision to avoid conflict while proceeding 
with negotiations had been supported, almost without ex­
ception, by the press and members of the National Government. 
In addition, widespread acceptance of this policy also ex­
isted within all segments of the intellectual community, 
encompassing members of the aristocracy and clergy as well 
as historians, journalists, academicians, and informed 
citizen groups. During this crisis, these various strands 
of Britain's establishment achieved a consensus due in 
part to the climate of opinion which the revisionist 
historians had helped to prepare. 
When the Cabinet looked at the mood of the country 
in the (days immediately following Germany's march into the 
Rhineland, it noted a variety of feelings. There seemed 
to be cautious optimism that Hitler would now be satisfied 
with troops once more on the West bank of the Rhine. German 
peace proposals and a willingness to rejoin the League of 
Nations further substantiated this mood of hope. Yet there 
was dismay over the FUhrer's techniques, along with anxiety 
that France might try to precipitate an incident which could 
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draw Britain into unwanted hostilities. In the long run, 
hopes of rebuilding the disturbed peace won out over fears 
of a conflict, but the awkward dilemma of how to explain 
Hitler's actions within the framework of eXisting inter­
national law still had to be resolved. One method which 
became highly successful was to shift the blame away from 
Germany and place it on the Treaty of Versailles, now 
almost universally condemmed as unfair and responsible 
for German revision. This reason provided a convenient 
context for rationalizing the gap Hitler's coup had rent 
in the status quo, and "for many people Hitler's action 
simply removed one of the major humiliations imposed by 
the bankrupt Versailles Treaty.,,1 
The policy Britain adopted indicated that the members 
of government were well aware of the public's views regarding 
the Rhineland. Baldwin, in his conversation with M. Flandin, 
had alluded to the country's reluctance to support France 
2in any military venture. And Von Hoesch, the German 
Ambassador, after a close study of the general temperament 
1Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers, pp. 102-104; Gannon, 
The British Press and Germany, pp. 10,297; Charles Loch 
Mowat, Britain Between the War: 1918-1940, (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 11955J 1971). 
2Jones, A Diary With Letters, p. 185; Middlemas and 
Barnes, Baldwin: A BiographY, pp. 919-920. 
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concluded that: 
••• the so called 'man in the street' generally 
takes the view that he does not care a damn if 
the Germans occupy their own territory with 
military forces, which is a thing all other 
states do anyway. He has not the slightest 
intention of getting himself involved and 
possibly even allowing himself to be drawn 
into these questions, and he is thoroughly 
angry with the French •••• 3 
Anthony Eden, the Cabinet official charged with implementing 
foreign policy, accepted Baldwin's appraisal of the situation 
and described his own impressions of the public derived from 
a taxi ride to the Foreign Office on March 9. After arriving 
at his destination, Eden queried the driver about news of 
remilitarization, to which the cab driver responded, "I 
suppose Jerry can do what he likes in his own back garden, 
can't he?,,4< Impressed, Eden considered the reply representa­
tive of the majority in Britain at the time, " •••when once 
convinced that no German attack on France or Belgium was 
immediately intended.,,5 Eden wavered little from his 
opinion, crediting the favorable reception given to the 
temporizing action taken by the Locarno signatories to the 
public's belief that Germany, in this instance, had a 
6
reasonable case. 
Throughout the crisis, Viscount Halifax worked closely 
3Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography, p. 922. 
4Eden , Facing the Dictators, p. 389. 
5Ibid •
 
6Ibid., pp. 396,425Q
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with Eden and the Foreign Office, and as an older, more 
distinguished and experienced statesman, accompanied the 
Secretary in his conversations with the other Locarno 
7powers. Halifax's reluctance to see Britain assume any 
specific military commitment directed against Germany would, 
Baldwin reasoned, restrain Eden from the temptation to take 
stronger action. The Lord Privy Seal's determination to 
keep out of a conflict was strengthened by his friends 
Lord Londonderry, Lord Lothian, and Geoffrey Dawson, who 
insisted on~~ •• the inherent if rough justice of Germany's 
position.u8 It was easy for Halifax to accept Lothian's 
interpretation of the German action as llwalking into her 
own garden" along with his view that the British people, 
••• hypnotized by German propaganda about the 
inequity of Versailles, and obsessed by feelings 
of unreasoning guilt were only too willing to shrug 
their shoulder at this gross violation of the 
Treaty.9 
Another important member of the Cabinet, Neville Chamberlain, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Baldwin's eventual successor, 
shared this appraisal of the country's mood. In the March 12, 
entry of his diary, Chamberlain recorded a talk with Flandin, 
7Alan Campbell Johnson, Viscount Halifax, (New York: 
Ives Washburn, Inc., 1941), pp. 396-397. 
8 Ibid ., p. 394. 
9Fredrick Edwin Smith, Halifax: The Life of Lord 
Halifax, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1965), pp. 350-351. 
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1l1 ••• emphasizing that public opinion here would not support 
us in sanctions of any kind.'"'O 
Even politicians who disagreed with the direction of 
policy recognized, along with Churchill, that opinion 
supported Germany at this time. 11 One of these men, Duff 
Cooper, Secretary of War in Baldwin's Cabinet since 1935, 
noted with some irony that less than a decade after the 
war those who had been most outspoken during the fighting, 
" ••• the keenest of spY-hunters and the most determined in 
their oaths never to speak to a German again were precisely 
the people who forgot the real crime of Germany most 
QUiCkly.,,12 But Cooper had moved in the opposite direction, 
and after hearing Hitler during a visit to Germany in 1933, 
he began to speak out publicly against the Nazi regime. 
Addressing a small meeting of the Junior Imperial League, 
Cooper told them that IIGermany was preparing for war on a 
scale and with enthusiasm unmatched in history.1I 13 Immedi­
ately the press reacted with hostility to the warning, and 
both Rothermere and Beaverbrook denounced Cooper in scathing 
10Keith Feiling, The Life of Nevile Chamberlain, (London: 
MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1946), p. 279. 
11Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 196-197. 
12Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, (New York: E. P. Dutton 
and Co., Inc., 1954), p. 195. 
13Ibid., pp. 181-182. 
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language, calling him a war-monger and his speech irresponsi­
14ble, jeopardizing the peace. The foresight of Cooper, 
,	 Churchill, and a few others who comprehended the true 
nature of the Nazi regime could not alter the large body 
of pro-German feeling that had grown up since the war. 
Harold MacMillan, observing the situation from the 
Tory backbench in the 1930's recognized the influence these 
attitudes posed for diplomatic relations with Germany. 
When Hitler entered the Rhineland, MacMillan commented often 
about the uncertainty and confusion of the British who had 
accepted Lord Lothain's phrase "into their own back-gardens" 
as the correct interpretation of events. Opinions like 
these reduced the issue to a "minor, almost trivial event" 
and blinded people to the true, critical nature of Hitler's 
move which " •.• started the avalanche destined to engulf, in 
its devasting path, the whole world.,,1 5 
Hitler's entry into the Rhineland provoked much con­
cern and discussion, not only among politicians, but within 
all segments of the intellectual community. One portion of 
the British establishment, the clergy, pressured the Govern­
ment into continuing to appease Germany. The Canon of 
Liverpool became a leading figure in this movement, trying 
to show that his anti-French and pro-German views were 
14Ibid., p. 182.
 
15MacMillan, Winds of Change, p. 427.
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shared by a great number of his fellow countrymen, "' ••• and 
in a democracy such as ours, the Government was bound, in 
forming policy, to take public opinion into account. ,,,16 
But at the same time the Canon actively worked to create 
the kind of opinion he wanted officials to listen to, 
preaching the wickedness of resorting to any pressure 
against Germany: 
'To continue an enforcement of the spirit of 
inequality upon Germany ~hundered the Cano~ 
is a proposal unworthy of our creed and of 
our country. To renew an occupation of their 
homeland is a proposal monstrous and unjusti­
fiable.'17 
Another church figure, the Bishop of London, also spoke in 
behalf of Germany, eXhorting Britain not to refuse the 
"olive-branch" offered by Hitler. To give weight to this 
plea, he recalled the errors made in the aftermath of the 
First War; revenge had been a mistake because 
The ordinary German people were kindly and 
sensitive to kind treatment. We should have 
taken Germany by the hand at the end of the 
War, when she had thrown over the Kaiser and 
the military caste. 
Many historians joined the clergy in ~alling for 
lenient treatment in the present crisis. In a letter to 
The Times, G. W. Headlam welcomed Hitler's move as a 
16The Canon of Liverpool as quoted in Cooper, Old 
Men Forget, p. 427. 
17Ibid ., p. 197. 
18The Times (London), March 12, 1936, p. 7. 
77 
chance to rebuild peace and happiness in Europe. The 
historian maintained that no one ever made himself or 
anyone else happier by persisting in bearing a grudge, and 
Headlam indicated the modifications he had made in earlier 
works to exemplify this principle: 
In any dispute it is very improbable that one 
party is entirely to blame; try to realize 
any fault, folly or mistake of your own, admit 
it to yourself and others •••• 19 
Therefore, he concluded, remilitarization must be thought 
of as a real opportunity for statesmanship to make an 
alliance between Britain, France, and Germany. 
The American historian Allan Nevins asked if the 
incident was really such a calamity, and claimed that 
British and even French opinion considered Germany's 
garrisoning the Rhineland inevitable. In this article, 
Nevins did deplore the methods used, but then argued that 
"no treaty ever endures long unless its signers believe it 
to be eQUitable •••• ,,20 But such had not been the case 
regarding Versailles, he asserted. Nevins hoped that 
Hitler's various offers would give Europe the opportunity 
to build anew. Even R. W. Seton-Watson, a supporter of 
Serbian innocence against the claims of Sidney B. Fay and 
Edith Durham, wrote to congratulate the Government and 
19The Times (London), March 9, 1936, p. 15. 
20Allan NeVins, "Defiance on the Rhine,1I Current 
History, XLIV (April, 1936), pp. 56-57. 
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Foreign Secretary " ••• on having kept their heads, combined 
firmness with conciliation, rejected the idea of sanctions 
against Germany ••• and so maintained a certain mediatory 
position.,,21 Another influential historian, Arnold TOYnbee, 
openly eXhibited his sympathy for Germany. On March 8, 
during a walk with Tom Jones, Toynbee discussed his recent 
trip to Germany where he became convinced of the sincerity 
behind Hitler's desire for peace in Europe and close 
friendship with England. 22 In the Survey of International 
Affairs that Toynbee produced each year for The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, he mentioned the 
importance pro-German attitudes had for influencing 
Government policies. According to Toynbee, the British 
were willing to tolerate appeasement of the Rhineland 
because of sympathy " •.•with German grievances against the 
peace settlement and with the German struggle to regain 
equality of status •••• ,,23 It is true, he agreed, Nazi 
excesses during the last few years had shaken this sympathy, 
but they had not destroyed " ••• the feeling that Germany had 
not had a fair deal ••• and in the existing circumstances 
there were many Englishmen who could find some excuse for 
21 R• W. Seton-Watson, "The German Dilemma," Fortnightly, 
CXXXIX (May, 1936), pp. 519-530. 
22Jones, A Diary with Letters, p. 181. 
23Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs,
 
1936, (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 276-277.
 
79 
Germany's action on the 7~ March. 1I24 Edward Hallet Carr, 
a British diplomatic historian and Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, 
the American revisionist, when analyzing the thirties at 
the end of the decade, agreed that a large body of opinion 
did exist which considered the Versailles Treaty unjust 
and thought it only fair that Germany should be given a 
chance to rectify these grievances. 25 
Journalists, another influential segment of the 
British establishment, joined in attacking the Treaty and 
called upon their country to redress its unfairness. Two 
articles appearing in the English Review illustrate this 
recurrent theme: 
•••widespread pro-German sentiment based on an 
appreciation of the unfairness of the Versailles 
Treaty and admiration for the remarkable efforts 26 
by which Germany has achieved her own regeneration. 
Another even more explicit account in The Nineteenth Century 
attacked Articles 42, 43, and 44 of the Treaty as inequitable 
and labeled demilitarization an indefensible proposition. 27 
Hitler emerged as the hero; only he had made the first real 
attempt since 1919 to restore normal conditions to Europe. 
24Ibid. 
25Edward Hallett Carr. The Twent Year's Crisis 1919-193, 
Harper Torchbook (New Yorki Harper and Row, 19 4 , p. 281; 
Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, From Versailles to Munich, pp. 16-17. 
26Wilfrid Hingle, "Revision of Versailles," The English 
Review, LXII (May, 1936), p. 523; E. :D. O'Brien, "Germany Looks 
Outwards," The English Review, LXIII (October, 1936), p. 345. 
27William H. Dawson, "Hitler's Challenge," The Nineteenth 
Century, XCIX (April, 1936), pp. 403-404. 
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Moreover, now that Germany has won back her ••• independ­11 
ence, self-respect, and honour as a Sovereign State, men 
of good will ought not to trouble over much about 'ways 
28
and means.'" 
Letters people wrote to the press served as another 
form for indicating how widespread feelings against the 
Treaty had become. One, carried by The Spectator, asked 
the Allies to completely discard the "ill-fated Treaty of 
Versailles" because pUblic opinion in England was so 
divided. The common people had an uneasy conscience toward 
Germany and no united front to stop Hitler could be rallied. 
Therefore, the public must be shown that Germany had been 
fairly treated first; then, if she strayed beyond the 
acceptable bounds of a new settlement, the Government could 
find support in mOVing against her. 29 Other letters 
28Ibid • For more articles in the same vein also see: 
"The Outl~" The Contemporary Review, CXLIX (April, 1936), 
p. 385; Charles Hobhouse, "International Disorder," The 
Contemporary ReView, CXLIX (May, 1936), p. 513; George 
Glasgow, I'Fore ign Affairs, Il The contemyorary Review, CXLIX 
(April, 1936), pp. 485-496; (May, 1936 , pp. 613-624; T. P. 
Conwell-Evens, "Germany in JUly-August," The Nineteenth 
Century, CXX (October, 1936), pp. 418-419; and "Between 
Berlin and London," The Nineteenth Century, CXIX (January, 
1936), pp. 57-79; H. N. Brailsford, "Britain Drifts Towards 
Hi tIer," The New Republic, LXXXVII (June 3, 1936), pp. 92-94; 
"Recovery of lihe Rhineland," Review of Reviews, XCII (April, 
1936), p •. 66; liThe World Over," The Living Age, CCCL (May, 
1936), pp. 189-191; and many others too numerous to mention. 
29H• Powys Greenwood, "Germany's Claim," The Spectator, 
CLVI (March 20, 1936), pp. 516-517. 
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sustained the impression that most people refused to see 
any harm in German violations of an already discredited 
Treaty; consequently, Britain should not promise too much 
support to France. 30 In fact, letters to the editor of 
The Times ran so overwhelmingly in favor of Germany, it 
caused Barrington-Ward to compain to Ambassador Joseph 
Kennedy about the newspaper's difficulty in finding enough 
letters stating anti-German views in order to balance the 
correspondence. 31 
There were other, informal, but no less important 
expressions of sympathy for Germany emanating from aristo­
cratic circles. One of these occurred at a famous and much 
quoted wee~nd at Blickling, Lord Lothian's home. On March 
7, 1936, he hosted a number of people, some of whom were 
part of the "Cliveden Set. 1I According to Tom:· Jones, 
secretary and close personal associate to Lloyd-George and 
then to Baldwin, those who composed Cliveden had considerable 
social and political impact. 32 Others have disputed the 
group's influence, asserting that regardless of the social 
status of those who dined with the Astors, they were 
responsible for very little; the disposition to appease 
was already Widespread, and it did not need these affairs 
30The Times (London), March 9, 1936, p. 15. 
31'Gannon, The British Press, p. 99. 
32Jones, Diary With Letters, pp. xxxiv-xi. 
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to reinforce it. 33 
These disputes aside, there is one thing revealed 
by those who attended the week-end at Lord Lothian's: the 
depth to which pro-German sympathy had permeated the British 
upper classes. The guests at Blickling included: Mr. and 
Mrs. Norman Davis, former United States Ambassador in 
London; Mr. and Mrs. Vincent Massey, Canadian High 
Commissioner in London, and subsequently Governor-General 
of Canada; Lord and Lady Astor; Sir Thomas and Lady Inskip, 
subsequently Lord Caldecote, and first Minister of Defense 
in Baldwin's Cabinet; Sir Walter and Lady Layton, Chairman 
of the News Chronicle-Star; Arnold Toynbee, historian and 
Director of the Studies at Chatham House, 1925-1955; and 
Tom Jones. 34 The guests, after listening to the news of 
Hitler's entry into the Rhineland on the wireless, followed 
Jones' suggestion to resolve themselves into a "Shadow 
Cabinet. 1I They then drew up a set of eight conclusions 
which they phoned into the Prime Minister. Generally the 
tone of these recommendations was conciliatory, and the 
first proposed welcoming Hitler's declaration whole­
heartedly.35 The next two, reflecting current opinion, 
33Gilbert and Gott, The Appeasers, p. 46. 
34Jones, A Diary With Letters, p. 179. 
35 Ibid • 
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asked that the breach of Part V of the Treaty be treated 
as " ••• relatively de minimus: and not to be taken tragically 
in view of the peace proposals which accompany it. 
Versailles is now a corpse and should be buried.,,36 The 
recommendations also stated that entrance to the zone should 
be treated as an assertion, or demonstration of recovered 
status of equality, and not as an act of aggression. 37 Jones 
hoped these suggestions would help the Prime Minister make 
up his mind about what course to take before he entered the 
Cabinet meeting and faced contradictory advice. Raldwin's 
secretary believed in the correctness of this council, con­
vinced " ••• the English would not dream of going to war 
because German troops had marched into their own territories-­
w~atever Treaties had been declared.,,38 Assessing the impact 
of the 'Shadow Cabinet's' role in determining what policy 
would be implemented, one author called it "unofficial but 
highly influential.,,39 Moreover, since Jones was Deputy 
Secretary of the real Cabinet at this time, " ••• he added 
the considerable weight of his own authority and his own 
influence on the Prime Minister.,,40 A. L. Rowse has made 
36Jones, A Diary With Letters, p. 179.
 
37 Ib id., p. 181.
 
38Ibid •
 
39Connell, The 'Office', p. 229.
 
40Ibid •
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a description of the closeness of this relationship between 
the two men: 
••• to Baldwin T. J. incarnated the Wisdom of the 
ages! Baldwin ceased to listen to Vansittart 
whose warnings were so uncomfortable and pre­
ferred T. J. whose siren voice contributed the 
more soothing passages to his speeches.41 
Whether, in fact, the group at Blickling determined British 
policy in this crisis is debatable. But there is no question 
that b¥ apprising the Prime Minister of the conclusions 
reached over the week.end, they helped confirm his opinion 
of the country's mood, further convincing Baldwin that 
little toleration for aiding France existed on this issue. 
Although the events at Lord Lothian's attracted much 
notoriety, there were other instances when members of the 
establishment spoke out in favor of appeasement. For example, 
the Executive Committee of the "Council of Action for Peace 
and Reconstruction" passed a resolution at the March 11 
meeting at Abbey House which regreted the German action, 
welcomed Eden's declaration that the Government would examine 
Hitler's peace proposals, repudiated the idea of sanctions 
against Germany, called on the Government to open discussions 
with Hitler and other powers through the League in order 
to obtain German re-entry, and asked for negotiation of a 
general European Pact of non-aggression. 42 Chairing this 
41Rowse, Appeasement: A Study in Political Decline, 
pp. 35-37. 
42The Times (London), March 12, 1936, p. 8. 
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meeting was David Lloyd-George, and among the members in 
attendance were Lady Snowden; Miss Eleanor Rathbone, MP; 
Drs. F. W. Norwood and S. M. Berry; and Sir Edgar Jones: a 
cross section of British society. 
It is hard to tell how many people who fell under 
the spell of appeasement had been convinced by reading the 
findings of the revisionist historians. One can say with 
more certainty that the list of those who took a lenient 
attitude toward Germany in 1936 was long, and it included 
members from all ranks of British life. By the end of the 
thirties, after appeasement had lost a great deal of its 
appeal and prestige, the mood would be far different. But 
in 1936, the country would not stand for anything that 
might lead to war: "On all sides one hears sympathy for 
Germany. ,,43 At this time, there was no doubt that a 
large reservoir of compassion for the plight of Germany 
existed. And it was official estimates of the depth of 
public opinion over the question of remilitarization which 
helped to determine the form British policy took in coping 
with Hitler's challenge in the Rhineland. 
43Nicolson, Diaries and Letter~! 1930-1939, pp. 248-250. 
CONCLUSION 
Delving into the motives underlying appeasement, 
Margaret George, author of a monograph on foreign policy, 
offers two explanations for its creation: the horror of 
war which had produced an overwhelming desire for pacifism, 
and a mounting sympathy for Germany " ••• directly attributable 
to the half-shamed awareness that the 'guilt verdict' of 
the Versailles Treaty, and the post-war punishment of Germany 
had been less than fair ••• to a German people who assuredly 
could not be stigmatized with criminal responsibility for 
the Great War.,,1 But even though she recognized the link 
between pro-German sentiment and appeasement, the author 
failed to uncover where or how this feeling originated. 
Since only a few years earlier Germany had been considered 
Britain's antagonist in a World War, there needs to be a 
satisfactory account for this reversal of attitudes. Thus, 
while this paper has focused on the influence of the 
revisionist historians during the inter-war period in Britain, 
the relationship between their findings and the development 
1Margaret George, The War ed Vision: British Forei n 
Policy, 1933-1939, (Pittsburg: niversity of Pittsburgh
Press, 1965), p. xvi. 
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of appeasement cannot be ignored. It was their demonstration 
that provided a necessary moral and ethical framework in 
which a new foreign policy could be constructed. 
Once Germany was no longer the enemy, British 
interests demanded that conditions on the continent return 
to normal as soon as possible. This implied a Germany 
established on an equal footing with the rest of the nations 
of Europe. Appeasement became the means through which 
Britain could satisfy German demands while simultaneously 
fulfilling her own goals. 
There is no doubt that the revisionist historians 
had a profound effect upon their times. In fact, this 
paper has proven it was their very success which made 
maintenance of the V€rsialles Settlement so difficult. 
Termination of the Treaty seemed the only solution. And 
whether this occurred by negotiation or flagrant breaches 
of its provisions did not seem to matter enough for people 
to go to war to defend what by 1936 had become indefensible. 
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cussion of the entire Rhineland issue. 
Vansittart, Robert, Lord. The Mist Procession: The Autobi­
ography of Lord Vansittart. London: Hutchinson and 
Co. Ltd., 1958. 
Always extremely anti-German, Vansittart uses 
this opportunity to validate his position. There is 
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little information on the workings of the Foreign 
Office that was of use for this topic. 
Ward, Sir A. W. and Gooch, George Peabody, eds. The Cambridge 
History of British Foreign Policy. 1866-1919. Vol. III 
of The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 
1783-1919. 3 vols. New York: MacMillan Co., 1923. 
A thorough discussion of the entire period, 
and a good standard account of the years prior to 
the war. 
Wegerer, Alfred von. A Refutation of the Versailles War 
Guilt Thesis. Translated by Edwin H. Zeydel. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930. 
The author, devoted to the cause of refuting 
the war-guilt thesis and thus destroying the basis 
upon which he believed the Treaty of Versailles to 
be based, hoped to encourage peaceful revision of 
the Treaty in order to forestall German revenge. His 
thesis is that Germany was not guilty of precipitating 
the war and all the evidence indicting her was merely 
circumstantial, based upon incomplete or distorted 
documents. Although he did present evidence showing 
the involvement of Serbia, Austria, Russia, and France, 
von Wegerer was less convincing when trying to 
exonerate Germany. 
Windrich, Elaine. British Labour's Foreign Policy. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1952. 
The monograph covers the Labour Party's foreign 
policy from the 1930's to the 1950's and tries to 
prove there is a continuity in the policy. Somewhat 
helpful to an understanding of the Party's views 
toward Germany. 
Wolfers, Arnold. Britain and France Between Two Wars: 
Conflicting Strategies of Peace Since Versailles. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940. 
An excellent analysis of the inter-war years, 
the author examines how Britain and France coped with 
post-Versailles Europe, each holding a different 
strategy for preserving the peace. Very helpfUl for 
this paper, especially in the discussion of the legal 
aspects of the Versailles Treaty. 
Wrench, John Evelyn. Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times. London: 
Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1955. 
Not a particularly helpful work for this paper. 
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It was largely a composition of Dawson's own diary 
notes which tended to recount whom he met with and 
when rather than elaborating on what was said. 
III. Newspapers and Periodicals 
Alexander, Hbrace G. "Germany's Demand for Equality. ,. The 
Spectator, CLIV (June 21, 1935), pp. 1058-1059. --­
This article argues for recognition of German 
equality and removal of the "war-guilt" clause. 
Barnes, Harry Elmer. "Assessing the Blame for the World War: 
A Revised Judgement Based on all the Available 
Documents." Current History, XX (Hay, 1924), pp. 
171-195. 
Barnes presents his thesis that Germany is 
not guilty and assigns responsibility in the following 
order: Austria, Russia, France, Germany, and England. 
-----r-:---. "England Arraigns Herself. 1I The Nation, CXXV 
(August 17, 1927), pp. 161-163. 
While reviewing British Documents on the Origins 
of the War, ed'. by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, 
Barnes uses the opportunity to relate his theory of 
English guilt, condemning Sir Arthur Nicolson and Eyre 
Crowe for pushing Grey toward war. 
___--==~. "Salvaging German War Guilt." The New Republic, 
LXIV (October 22, 1930), pp. 270-273. 
Barnes reviews The Coming of the War, 1914 by 
Bernadotte Schmitt, criticizing it as the last great 
effort of the "salvagers" to select and interpret facts 
in order to preserve pre-war theories. Barnes also 
reviews The Refutation of the Versailles War Guilt 
Thesis by Alfred von Wegerer, praising it as a careful 
and lucid book which thoroughly destroys both Schmitt 
and the Versailles thesis. 
Beard,	 Charles A. lIHeroes and Villains of the World War." 
"Current History, XXIV (August, 1926), pp. 730-735. 
Beard evaluates the ideas of Harry Elmer 
Barnes, agreeing with the need to revise the Versailles 
war-guilt clause. But he rejects attempts to white-wash 
German leaders. 
______~~~~; Becker, Carl; Blakeslee, G. H.; Buell, Raymond 
Leslie; Lingelbach, William E.; Morse, A. E.; 
Schmitt, Bernadotte E.; Seymour, Charles; Wright, 
Quincy. "Assessing the Blame. 1I Current History, 
XX (June, 1924), pp. 452-462. 
The editors of Current History submitted an 
article by Harry Elmer Barnes to professors of history 
at the chief American universities, all of whom were 
recognized as experts. The majority of those who 
commented had accepted, by 1924, at least part of the 
revisionist argument, indicating how far these ideas 
had progressed toward acceptance. 
Beazley, Raymond C. "The Great Reversal. 1I The Christian 
Century, XLIV (June 30, 1927), pp. 805-806. 
The author presents a highly favorable review 
of Harry Elmer Barnes' work, and calls his book 
trustworthy and readable. He believes it will produce 
a reversal of judgement which in time will change 
the Treaty. 
Binkley, R. C. "New Light on Russia's War Guilt. 1I Current 
History, XXIII (January, 1926), pp. 531-533. 
Binkley suggests three ways to view the origins 
of the war, "guilt,1t "responsibility," and "cause." 
He then produces a document from the Special Journal 
of the Council of Ministers, 11 July 1914, from Russia, 
to prove that her intentions were pacific and honorable. 
___----",---;-~. "Revision of World War History.1t The Historical 
Outlook, XIX (March, 1928), pp. 109-112. 
Binkley claims that because of its involvement 
with the Treaty, the issue of war origins cannot be 
extricated from politics. 
Brailsford, H. N. "Britain Drifts Towards Hitler." The New 
Republic, LXXXVII (June 3, 1936), pp. 92-94. 
The article discusses the division of the 
British Cabinet and the Tory Party over the conduct 
of foreign affairs: one school is headed by Churchill 
and Austin Chamberlain and sees Germany as the future 
enemy; and the other school, represented by Geoffrey 
Dawson and Lord Lothian, regrets the follies of the 
Versailles Pe~ce. 
"British Opinion and British Policy. II The New Statesman and
 
Nation, XI (March 21, 1936), pp. 444-445.
 
This editorial attempts to explain the
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confusion of British people over German remilitarization 
by attributing it to their feelings of guilt over 
mistreatment of Germany at Versailles. 
Cammaerts, Emile. "War Responsibility in 1914 and Today." 
Edinburgh Review, CCXLI (January, 1925), pp. 38-55. 
Even while finding merit with the traditional 
interpretation of the origins of the war, Cammaerts 
recognizes the political and diplomatic impact of 
the issue because of its connection to the Treaty. 
He claims the settlement of this question is vital 
for the peace of Europe, and attempt.s to refute the 
revisionists' findings. 
Conwell-Evens, T. P. "Between Berlin and London." The 
Nineteenth Century, CCXIX (January, 1936), pP:-57-59. 
In an article highly favorable to rapprochement 
between England and Germany the author sees this as 
the best means of securinr European peace. He also 
calls for appeasing Germany by revision of the Treaty. 
___......,.,,.....-..-,-. "Germany in July-Au~ust." The Nineteenth 
Century, CXX (October, 1936), pp. 409-419. 
A very pro-German article in which the author 
refers to a visit to Germany and lauds the great 
domestic programs and Hitler's foreign policy. 
Coolidge, Archibald Cary. "Dissatisfied Germany." Foreign 
Affairs, IV (October, 1925), pp. 35-46. 
An analysis of the effectiveness and scope of 
the German propaganda effort since the signing of 
the Treaty. Also the article tries to show the lack 
of wisdom of basing the Treaty on the premise of 
German responsibility for the war. 
Dalton, Hugh. "The Present International System." The 
Political Quarterly, VI (July, 1935), pp. 323-332. 
Dalton presents a discussion of what Britain's 
foreign policy ought to be according to Labour. 
Dawson, William Harbutt. "Hitler's Challenge. 1I The Nineteenth 
Century, CCXIX (April, 1936), pp. 401-416. 
A tremendously pro-German article which calls 
for complete revision in favor of Germany and welcomes 
remilitarization as a step in that process. Also 
extremely hostile remarks are made against .. France. 
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Delbruck, Hans. "Did the Kaiser Want the War?" The 
Contemporary Review, CXIX (March, 1921), pP:-322-345. 
The writer tries to prove that even though 
Germany legally declared war, it was the Russians 
who really caused war by mobilizing her whole army 
and fleet on July 30, and he supports the revisionist 
position. 
Demartial, Georges. "A Frenchman Lays Blame on France, 
Russia, and England. 1I Current History, XXIII (March, 
1926), PP. 787-793. 
The author, an eminent French publicist and 
exponent of the revisionist theory tries to prove 
the French responsibility for the war. 
Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. HAn Appeal to British Fair 
Play. II The Nation and the Athena~um,XXXV (August 30, 
1924), pp. 660-661. . 
This article by the British revisionist reviews 
the German propaganda effort presented in a cleverly 
worded pamphlet. Dickinson suggests that the charges 
brought against Germany by the Allies were false; yet, 
upon them the peace of Europe has been based and it 
is a lie. 
Durham, Mary Edith. TlCroatia and Great Serbia." Contemporary 
Review, CXXIV (November, 1923), pp. 590-600. 
The author presents her views about Serbian 
guilt in bringing about the war. 
• "Fresh Light on Serbia and the War." ------~C-o-n~t-emporary Review, CXXIV (September, 1928), pp. 304-311. 
In addition to crediting Serbia with the blame 
for the whole affair, Durham also attacks Grey for 
his failure to recognize Austrian justification for 
the ultimatum. 
Earle,	 Edward Mead. "A Wise and Upright Story of War 
Responsibility." The New Republic, LVII (December 
5, 1928), pp. 73-75. 
A highly favorable review of Fay's Origins 
of the World War, calling it well-researched, 
scholarly, thoroughly documented, and courageous. 
"England and France." The New Statesman, XXXII (November 24, 
1928), pp. 216-217. 
This article illustrates growing anti-French 
sentiment and rising pro-German feelings. 
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Fay, Sidney Bradshaw. "New Light on the Origins of the 
World War." Part I American Historical Review, XY:.V 
(July, 1920), pp. 616-639; Part II, L~VI (October, 
1920), pp. 37-53; Part III, XXVI (January, 1921), 
pp. 225-254. 
In three separate issues, Fay developes his 
ideas on the origins of the war which later appeared 
in bis two volume work on this topic. In the first 
article, Fay discusses the situation in 1914 and 
German and Austrian methods of dealing with it, 
emphasizing that the Kaiser and Bethmann were not 
villains, merely simpletons.
In the second article, he maintains that 
Germany made a real, if belated effort to induce 
Austria to accept a peacefUl solution. Germany did 
bave to accept responsibility for giving Austria a 
free hand on July 5. 
~he third article discusses Russia and the 
other major powers, seeing Russian mobilization as 
the direct cause of Germany's own. 
• "Serbia's Responsibility for the World War." ------~C-u-r-r-ent History, XXIII (October, 1925), pp. 41-48. 
Recapitulation of his analysis of Serbian 
guilt, later discussed in his book, is the theme of 
this article. Fay credits the Serbian Government 
with knowledge of the ~ssassination. 
____~....---_. "Who Started the War?" The New Republic, XLV 
(January 6, 1926), pp. 185-186. 
In this very favorable review of an article 
by Ex-Chancellor Marx, Fay agrees with his illustrations 
of the Triple Entente's errors in helping to bring 
about war. 
___-----.-__• "Serajevo Fifteen Years After." The LiviI1& 
Age, CCCVI (July, 1929), pp. 374-379. 
In discussing the events leading up to the 
assassination, Fay concluded that Serbia must share 
responsibility because there is evidence based on 
explicit statements of the late M. Jovanvich that 
M. Pashich, Serbian Prime Minister was aware of the 
plot for several days. 
• "Pre-War Diplomacy and the Press." Current ---~H~i-s~t-ory, XXXIII (November, 1930), pp. 212-217. 
Fay blames the newspaper campaign against 
Germany as a cause of war due to the quantity of 
anti-German feeling and suspicion that was produced 
which helped create and sustain tensions wbile 
also poisoning the atmosphere. 
IlForward. lI New Statesman and Nation, VIII (September 29, 
1934), pp. 415-419. 
This article discusses Labour's foreign policy 
in contrast to that of the Conservative Party. 
Frantz, Gunther. IlDid Russian r1obilization Force War' in 
1914? 'I Current History, XXV (March, 1929), pp.
852-858. 
The author, a recognized authority on the issue 
of the Russian role in bringing about the war, supports 
the idea of mobilization by that country left Germany 
no alternative but to declare war. 
"Germany and France. lt The Spectator, CLVI (March 27,1936), 
pp. 564-565. 
In this editorial, the reoccupation of German 
territory by German troops is seen as no reason for 
war. There is already acceptance of remilitarization 
as a fait accompli. 
IIGermany Invades the Rhineland." The Christian Century, LIII 
(March 18, 1936), p. 422. 
Although hostile to Hitler, this journal's 
editorial is forced to accede to remilitarization 
because it sees the issue as tied to a Treaty which 
is unjust and no longer a viable force in international 
relations. 
Glasgow, Geor~e. "Foreign Affairs. 1I The contemporary Review, 
CXLIX (May, 1936), pp. 613-624. 
In this article the author accepts Hitler's 
argument that the Versailles Treaty is unjust. He 
is only offended by German violations of the Locarno 
Pact. 
Gooch,	 George Peabody.. lILetter to the Editor--The Nyth of 
War-Guilt. 'I The Nation and the Athenae:um,XXXI 
(September 16, 1922), p. 193. 
Responding to an article on the myth of war­
gUilt, Gooch claims it is lucid and dispassionately 
written. 
Greenwood, H. Powys. "Germany's Claims," The Spectator, 
CLVI (March 20, 1936), pp. 516-517. 
This is a letter to the editor asking that the 
Treaty of Versailles be disregarded in reference to 
the Rhineland crisis. 
Gwynn, 
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Stephen. "Bri tish Policy in the Cris is." The 
Fortnightly Review, CXXIX (April, 1936), PP:-385-391. 
Britain would not support France in challenging 
Germany because of the peace proposals Hitler offered 
and because this move constituted a "final repudiation 
of 'war-guilt.'" 
H.	 W. M. liThe Question of Responsibility." The Nation and 
the Athenaaum, XXX (October 29. 1921), pp. 171-173. 
This author suggests that unless it can be 
proven indisputably that Germany alone dug "the pit 
into which she and the rest of the world fell," then 
the Treaty of Versailles is based on a lie. 
lIHerr Hitler and Versailles. lI The Spectator, CLIV (May 17, 
1935), pp. 824-825. 
This editorial indicates that there is a 
growing movement for revision of certain provisions 
of the Treaty. 
Hingle, Wilfr id. "Revis ion of Versailles." The Engl ish 
Review, LXII (May, 1936), p. 523. 
The author calls for a thorough revision of 
the Versailles Treaty in the wake of German remili­
tarization. Also the article claims that a widespread 
pro-German feeling is the product of recognition that 
the Treaty was unfair. 
Hobhouse, Sir Charles. "International Disorder." The 
Contemporary Review, CXLIX (May, 1936), pp. 513-521. 
The author supports the Locarno Pact but does 
not mind that Germany has violated the Versailles 
Treaty prOVisions. 
Hoffman, M. M. HNultifold War Guilt. 1I The Commonweal, XII 
(April 29, 1931), pp. 707-709. 
An article that calls for revision of the 
Treaty of Versailles, it points out the growing 
popular demand for this both in England and America. 
"Is There A Way To Peace?IT The New Statesman and Nation, XI 
(March 14, 1936), pp. 372-373. 
This editorial suggests that British public 
opinion will accept remilitarization; it is only the 
method used by Hitler that is offensive. 
Kau tsky, Karl. IIGermany Since the War." Fore ign Affairs, 
II (December 15, 1922), pp. 99-119. 
Attacking the Treaty of Versailles in this 
article, the author critisizes the basis upon which 
it had been made. He says it is unfair to blame 
the German people for tbe errors of a government 
which they have already repudiated. Kautsky is 
quite harsh on Article 231. 
Montg~las, Max, Oount. "Letters to the Editor." The Nation, 
OXXI (November 18, 1925), pp. 578-579. 
Montgelas makes a favorable review of Pierre 
Renouvin's book, calling it the !lsanest and most 
up-to-date volume to come out of France." 
Mowat, Robert Balmain. "Great Britain and Germany in the 
Early Twentieth Oentury." The English Historical 
Review, XLVI (July, 1931), pp. 423-441. 
In his analysis of the period prior to the 
war, Mowat blames both sides for a failure to 
arrive at a rapprochement which would have insured 
the peace of Europe. He points out errors made by 
Britain in a failure to be receptive on two oc­
casions to German overtures for an Anglo-German
alliance, thereby sustaining revisionists' premises 
that Germany alone, did not bring about the war. 
Nevins, Allan. "Defiance on the Rhine." Ourrent History, 
XLIV (April, 1936), pp. 56-57. 
This historian asks if remilitarization is 
really such a catastrophe and suggests that it is 
only Hitler's methods which opinion cannot accept.
Moreover, no ,.treaty can endure unless its signers 
believe it to be equitable. 
Nevinson, Henry W. liThe Great Revision. 1I The Saturday 
Review of Literature, III (November 20, 1926), 
pp. 309-311­
A highly favorable review of Harry Elmer Barnes' 
book The Genesis of the World War is made by the author 
who supports the view that Poincare and Sazonov are 
the two chief villains of the war. He calls Barnes' 
thesis both powerful and well-docv~ented. 
Nicolson, Harold. "Has Britain a Policy?" Foreign Affairs, 
XIV (July, 1936), pp. 549-562. 
Nicolson indicates that in 1936 a strong wave 
of pro-German feeling existed in England. 
O'Brien, E. D. "Germany Looks Outwards." The English 
Review, LXIII (October, 1936), p. 345. 
An article in which the Treaty's unfairness 
is attacked. 
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Ratcliffe, S. K. "Ourselves and the New G'ermany." 
Contemporary Review, CXLIV (September, 1933), 
pp. 264-275. 
In an article analyzing the Nazi revolution, 
the author claims that one issue of Nazi propaganda
the IIwar-guilt lie,1I has found agreement among most 
Englishmen. Furthermore, it was a serious mistake 
on the part of those who wrote the Treaty. 
llRecovery of the Rhineland." Review of Reviews, XCII (April, 
1936), p. 66. 
This editorial views remilitarization as quite 
justified and part of a five step program in Germany's 
return to independence. 
Renouvin, Pierre. "How the War Came." Foreign Affairs, 
VI (April, 1929), pp. 384-397. 
The French historian gives a mixed review of 
Fay's two volume work on The Origins of the War, 
finding that his research into the immediate cause 
of the war--the assassination--is excellent, but that 
his conclusions are not always valid. On the other 
hand, he criticizes Fay's work on a number of counts: 
it has not yet obtained the absolute objectiveness 
to which it aspires; and it is too critical of 
France and Poincare. 
Review of Reviews, LXXIX (January, 1929), p. 90. 
A summary of Sidney ~ Fay's Origins of the 
War is made, recognizing the significance of the 
revisionist historian's work on international relations. 
Schmitt, Bernadotte Everly. "Triple. Alliance and Triple 
Entente, 1902-1914." American Historical Review, 
XXIX (April, 1924), pp. 449-473. 
In a paper read at the December, 1923 meeting 
of the American Historical Society, Schmitt presented 
his views of the origins of the war. He stressed the 
arms race and militarism as definite underlying 
motives and pointed to both England and France's 
responsibilities for the war. But in the last 
analysis, Schmitt maintained that Germany must 
assume a ~ajor share for the war. 
____':"":""""__:-:'. IIA Distinguished American Historian Apportions 
the War Guilt. 1I Current History, XXIII (March, 1926), 
pp. 796-803. 
While reviewing the article by Georges Demartial 
in the same issue (see entry on Demartial) Schmitt 
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suggests that although Germany is legally responsible 
for the war, on the moral and political level new 
documents can give other interpretations, among 
these being the European system of alliances and 
militarism. Schmitt concludes that responsibility 
was divided. 
----~";:;7"~. ., July, 1914." Fore ign Affairs, V (October,
1926), pp. 132-147. 
In this article Schmitt reviews seven books 
covering the origins of the war, ranging from 
standard interpretations by Grey and Poincare to 
those of revisionists such as Dickinson, Durham, 
and Barnes. 
• "Where Does the Guilt Lie?" The Saturday------~R-e-v~i-ew of Literature, III (November 20, 1926), 
pp. 311-312. /
In a review of Poincare's memoirs, Schmitt 
supports the idea of divided responsibility for the 
war; France, Russia, and Germany are all gUilty to 
some degree. 
... "Diplomatic Europe." The Saturday Review of 
Literature, V (March 2, 1929), pp. 721-72b. 
Schmitt gives a highly favorable review of 
Fay's two volume work, seeing it as a well-written, 
thorough, and masterly analysis. Schmitt does differ 
from Fay in assigning to Germany a larger share of 
the responsibility for the outbreak of war. 
• "The Origins of the War." The Journal of -------M~o~d-e-rn History, I (March, 1929), pp. 112-119. 
A review of Fay's book in which Scrunitt 
indicates the ways he differs from Fay over 
apportioning the blame to Germany. 
Seton-\'latson, R. W. "The German Dilemma." The Fortnightly 
Review, CXXXIX (May, 1936), pp. 319-330. 
Congratulations are made by the author to the 
British Government and the Foreign Secretary for 
having kept their heads in the crisis. He dismisses 
Versailles as having been signed under duress; therefore, 
a certain plausible case could be made for violations 
of its prOVisions. 
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Seymour, Charles. "Questions of War Responsibility. 11 
Yale Review, XIII (July, 1924), pp. 790-794. 
In his review of three books on the war, 
Seymour suggests that what have become known as the 
Kautsky documents show Germany was not a villain, 
and although willing to support Austria, was not 
anxious for a general war. 
Temperley, Harold. I'The Coming of the War." Foreigh Affairs, 
IX (January, 1931), pp. 317-338. 
This is a generally favorable review of'books 
by revisionists such as Fay, Schmitt, Renouvin, and 
others. Temperley sees Renouvin as the most impartial, 
but suggests that Fay and Schmitt are lenient with 
the Central Powers. 
• "The Archbishop and the Treaty.1I New Statesman --------a-n~d-=Nation, III (April 2, 1932), p. 417. 
This article contains a discussion of Article 
231, how it came to be misinterpreted by the Germans 
at the Peace Conference, and the effects on international 
relations and reparations. 
"The Blunder and the Way Out." The Nation, XXVI (February
14, 1920), pp. 661-662. 
An early editorial in a major journal called 
for a revision of the Treaty because it was vindictive 
and could not be enforced. 
"The German Challenge." The Spectator, CLVI (March 13, 1936), 
pp. 4-56-457. 
In this editorial the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland is seen as a small thing, and Versailles 
is discounted as a dead issue. 
The New Statesman, XXVI (October 17, 1925), p. 100. 
An editorial in this periodical ~efers to the 
Treaty of Versailles as morally a II scrap of paper" 
because it does not have the support of even a 
majority of its signatories. 
"The Responsibility for the War. 1I The New Statesman, XXV 
(October 31, 1925), pp. 684-685. 
Although this journal admits that Germany is 
not solely responsible for the war, nevertheless she 
is mainly at fault. The article does indicate that 
by 1925 there was a large body of opinion ready to 
accept the reYlsionist theories. 
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The Times (London), March 7, 1936-March 31, 1936. 
No study of this period could be made without 
information found in this most influential of British 
papers. Not only did its editorials reflect the 
Government's position on many issues, its editorials 
set a pace and tone for molding public opinion. 
"The Week-End Review." New Statesman and Nation, CCCLXVII 
(March 14, 1936), p. 367. 
There is little doubt, according to this 
article, that while the British public deplored 
Hitler's methods it accepted his right to be in 
the Rhineland. 
"The World Over." The Living Age, CCCL (May, 1936), pp. 
189-191. 
This article sees the mild official and public 
response to remilitarization as part of a definite 
pro-German bias. 
"Two Ap~eals for International Decency." The Nation, CXXII 
(April 28, 1926), pp. 485-486. 
Sponsored by Gilbert Murray, these two appeals 
were made in behalf of reconsidering Article 231 and 
Articles 227 to 230 of the Versailles Treaty. These 
documents were first signed by over one hundred 
Frenchmen and then many well-known Englishmen, among 
them a number of revisionist historians. 
I'War-Guilt Myths, II The Living Age, CCCXV (October 28, 
1922), pp. 218-222. 
In an editorial discussing an article appearing 
the preVious month in The Nation and the Atheneum 
the Whole issue of revisionist interpretations is 
discussed and the connection between the historians' 
findings and the "whole foundation of the Versailles 
settlement" is made. 
Waugh, Alec. "History Text Books as a Factor in International 
Relations." International Affairs, XV (November, 
1936), pp. 877-896. 
In an address first presented at the March 26, 
1936 meeting at Chatham House, the author developed
the idea that history books have made some impact 
on international relations by shaping public opinion 
on certain issues. He cited the revisionist 
historians' findings about the First War to exemplify
this premise. 
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Wegerer, Alfred von. I1The Evidence Challenged." Current 
History, XXVIII (August, 1928), pp. 810-819. 
The author concludes that from the evidence 
available to those at Versailles charged with 
establishing responsibility for the war no fair 
conclusions could be drawn because the documents 
were faulty, abridged, and full of omissions. 
___---=-__• "A Tragic Scoop: The Premature Mobilization 
Report in Germany.fI The Living Age, XXXIV (July 15, 
1922), pp. 138-141. 
Another attempt by von Wegerer to popularize 
the German propaganda effort aimed at discrediting 
the Treaty. 
Woolf,	 Leonard. "Labourfs Foreign Policy.1I Political 
Quarterly, IV (October, 1933), pp. 504-524. 
Woolf sees the Labour Party's policies, 
stated by Arthur Henderson, as inadequate to deal 
wi th the Fasc is t po\'rers who do not share its desire 
either for the League or peace. 
IV, Unpublished Materials: 
Goldman, Aaron, L. IICrisis in the Rhineland: Britain, 
France and the Rhineland. 11 Unpublished Ph. D. 
dissertation, Indiana University, 1967. 
Although the author discusses events both 
prior to and succeeding the crisis in the Rhineland 
with an examination of British and French roles 
and their relationship with each other, for the 
purpose of the paper it was of little help. The 
impact of the revisionists was never considered, 
and the study was not very analytical. 
